خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٢‎٦] (٢٤٨/٥١)

3
the demonstration was called off. In Azerbaijan, too, there were signs towards
the end of March that the local Tudeh leaders were drawing in their horns and
« | , trying to restrain the activities of their more unruly followers. But in Meshed
towards the end of March there was renewed Tudeh activity when their leaders
harangued the crowds in the streets after scores of Soviet tommy-gunners had
been patrolling the streets.
4* 8. In February Seyyid Zia published the programme of his party, called
the “ National Will ” party, which he now declared open. In spite of violent
attacks in all the Soviet-inspired press, and in many other newspapers,
Seyyid Zia and his cause appeared to be making good progress, at least in Tehran,
where it was claimed that by the end of March the party had between nine and
ten thousand adherents.
9. On the 4th March Dr. Musaddiq, one of Bayat's principal supporters,
accused the Majlis of condoning corruption and left the Assembly declaring he
would not take his seat again. Two days later, however, he allowed himself to
be escorted to the Majlis by a crowd of students who tried to force their way in.
In the ensuing disturbance one student was killed and a few people were hurt.
Bayat himself and other members of the Government were widely accused of
complicity in this demonstration against the “ reactionary Majlis. But the
incident did Bayat no good and greatly increased the criticism against his
Government. Finally, on the 18th March, representatives of the “ Mihan,”
“ Mustaqill,” “ Democrat,” and part of the “ Ittehadi Mill! ” fractions called
on the Shah to inform His Majesty that the majority of the Deputies no longer
supported Bayat and to request His Majesty to advise him to resign. The Shah
was, however, reluctant to dismiss Bayat, and expressed the opinion that his
Government should continue in office at laast until after the No Ruz holidays.
10. Bayat and his Government in fact were still in office at the end of
March, owing largely to the lack of cohesion and determination of his opponents;
and the Majlis, having adjourned for the No Ruz holidays, did not meet again
before the end of the period under review owing to the lack of a quorum.
Soviet Oil Claim and the Yalta Conference.
11. Towards the end of March the embassy were authorised to make to
4 4 the Persian Government, in reply to their numerous enquiries as to the extent to
which Persian affairs had been discussed at Yalta, an unofficial and oral com
munication in the following terms :—
* « “ Persian affairs, though not on the agenda of the conference, were dis
cussed briefly; and while there was no sign that the Russians had abandoned
their desire for an oil concession, there was such complete agreement as to
the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia that it would
have been superfluous to repeat the declarations already made on this
subject.”
12. In point of fact the Russians at Yalta had adopted a very unforthcom
ing and aggrieved attitude where Persia was concerned, repeating many of their
earlier mis-statements regarding the circumstances of the oil concession crisis and
flatly rejecting all suggestions for an agreed official statement on Persia. Never
theless the brief discussions on this subject probably served to convince the Soviet
Government that any overt pressure with a view to securing a reversal of the oil
decision would adversely affect their relations with Great Britain and the United
States ; and, while of course they hotly denied that any such pressure was being
exercised, it was noticeable that a short while after the close of the conference the
Persian newspapers controlled by the Soviet Embassy gradually ceased their
agitation for the cancellation of Dr. Musaddiq’s oil law.
Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.
13. The Anglo-Soviet censorship “war,” waged throughout the greater
part of the period under review with increasing intensity, resulted in a complete
victory for the British side.
14. Late in the summer of 1944 a proposal had been made in general terms
to the Soviet Ambassador that a truce should be called to “ ideological censor
ship.” British retaliatory measures had at that time hardly begun to inconveni-
, , ence the Russians, and although M. Maximov undertook to transmit the proposal
to Moscow for consideration it is doubtful whether he did so.
15. On the 26th January the proposal was reiterated in a more detailed and
concrete form. It was suggested that both sides should cease to censor all incom
ing printed matter published in English or Russian and posted, through the
intermediary of officially-approved agencies, by publishing firms in the United
[66—57] b 2