خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٢‎١] (٢٤٨/٤٢)

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of junior officers and non-commissioned officers, with some success, it is
believed. In spite of all this some slight general improvement is noticeable in
the troops in the capital. In the northern provinces of Khorassan and
Azarbaijan the troops are entirely demoralised by the high-handed actions of
the Russian authorities who allow them no liberty of action, restrict them to
certain defined areas and insist on the limitation of their numbers to what
amounts to little more than token forces, which add nothing to the authority c£~ r ^
prestige of the Persian Government; rather do they make the Persian authorities
look ridiculous.
48. The influence of General Ridley and his mission in any matters other |
than supply is less and less in evidence. The term of their contract ended in
March of this year, but at the request of the Persian Government the United
States Government has allowed them to stay on for the time being.
Gendarmerie.
49. The gendarmerie, except in the capital, remains much where it has
been for the last three years—corrupt, inefficient, creating rather than preventing
disorder; and Colonel Schwarzkopf’s schemes, rules and regulations are, with a
few exceptions, still on paper. Antagonism between the army and the
gendarmerie has been steadily increasing, and parties sent out by both forces
to pursue robbers have more than once come to blows with each other.
Co-operation between the two forces is rare. The retransfer of the gendarmerie
to the control and administration of the War Office is now receiving some serious
consideration. Such a step should lead to economy and might lead to improved
security.
50. Gendarmerie District Headquarters have been abolished except in Pars
and Azarbaijan, and gendarmerie regiments are now under the direct command of
Gendarmerie Headquarters in Tehran. This will complicate the relations of
the Governor-General with the gendarmerie in his province: he previously had
the district commander with him at the provincial capital.
Police. *
51. As Russian provocation of the proletariat through the Tudeh party
and, consequently, the probabilities of disturbance and riots in the towns
increase so does the police force become less capable of maintaining order.
Always corrupt, it has now reached incredible depths of venality and inefficiency.
Many of its officers are in the pay of one or other of the money-making rackets
or one or other of the political parties. No impartial action can then be expected
in the treatment of any situation. For this state of affairs successive Govern
ments are, of course, primarily to blame. Even if an energetic and capable
chief of police were to be found he would be frustrated by the pusillanimity and
inefficiency of Ministers. Only a mission of foreign officers with adequate
powers, which once granted can be exercised independently of changes in
Government, and adequate funds at their disposal can be expected to turn the
Persian police force into an instrument for the impartial suppression of disorder,
and even they, as the experience of the American officers with the gendarmerie
has shown, will have no easy task. The quality of the Persian police is of
particular interest to His Majesty’s Government since it is on that force that
reliance must, in the first instance," be placed for the protection of Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company labour against intimidation and subversive provocation.
Persian Air Force.
52. Under the personal stimulus of the Shah, there has been a good deal
of talk about modernising and expanding the air force. The advice of the
Royal Air Force as to equipment, training and organisation has been sought
and in great measure taken, but in view of the chronically meagre air force vote
progress is not likely to be rapid.
53. Meanwhile, there is some superficial improvement in day to day work,
but morale under Brigadier Khosrovani remains bad.
Civil A ir Lines in Persia.
54. The Iranian State Airline, under the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs j
and Telephones, now operates two return services a week to Bagdad via
Kermanshah and one to Bushire via Isfahan and Shiraz. Passengers are not
(officially) carried south of Isfahan pending the installation of wireless facilities
on this section of the route.