خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎٨] (٢٤٨/٣٥)

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the Soviet Government was putting unfair pressure on the Persian Government
to grant them an oil concession in North Persia.) One cause is that the Soviet
section of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship conducts a heavy political
censorship on messages from foreign correspondents in Tehran, and the latter
dare not circumvent it lest they or their colleagues elsewhere should be penalised.
Another is that the news agencies disregard messages from their Tehran
/ correspondents and imagine that Persian news is only news if it comes from
'Moscow. This is disastrous since the Tass Agency in Tehran, as an official agency,
is exempt from the Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship and telegraphs what messages
it likes, and these form the basis of foreign correspondents messages from
Moscow. Conequently it is only the visiting journalist to Persia who can evade
the Soviet censor and speak plainly.
18. The following are illustrations of the effect of the Soviet censorship
on foreign correspondents. When Mr. Sulzberger, the New York Times special
correspondent in Moscow, passed through Tehran he was scornful regarding the
way correspondents allowed themselves to be used as instruments of Soviet
propaganda about Persia. His words had scarcely died on his lips, when he
sent from Tehran an interview with the leader of the Tudeh party, in which he
publicised the lie that the Tudeh was a genuinely democratic party. After
arriving in Moscow he did worse still, and telegraphed a message stating that
the British facilitated the return of Seyyid Zia to Persia, thus representing us
and Seyyid Zia as the joint opponents of the Soviet Union and of the Tudeh
party. When taxed with this message Mr. Sulzberger alleged that he had written
as near as he thought possible to the edge of the Soviet censorship’s disapproval
with the aim of throwing ridicule on the recent Soviet press comment on Persian
affairs; if his message had given a pro-Soviet impression then his sub-editor in
New York had failed to detect his ironic intent! Shortly afterwards, the war
correspondent of the Chicago Daily News also telegraphed an interview with the
leader of the Tudeh party, containing the whopping assertion that the latter
received no money from the Russians. His Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow
commented that neither of these correspondents was in the least deceived by
Soviet propaganda about Persia, but that if they wished to enter Soviet territory
again they could not criticise Soviet policy openly.
19. This question was also discussed with the State Department, who under
took to investigate whether an American editorial writer or commentator could
produce an impartial article on Persia which might be telegraphed abroad. (So
far as this embassy is aware, nothing has come of this suggestion.) This
embassy then suggested that the Daily Express correspondent in the Middle East
should visit Persia and send a message after having left the country. The
Foreign Office replied that neither the Daily Express nor any other newspaper
wanting to have a correspondent in the Soviet Union or Soviet-occupied Europe
would publish any article unflattering to the Russians; the best course would be
to get an article published in the Economist or Manchester Guardian, as they had
no Moscow correspondent.* This embassy commented that it was disturbing
when important English newspapers, including presumably The Times, dare not
send truthful messages from Persia lest they should lose the privilege of sending
untruthful ones from Moscow.
Persian Internees: British-Soviet A menities Regarding Same.
20. Twenty-six Persian internees were released from internment at the
request of the British and Soviet authorities in April and May. However, their
war against Germany having ended, the Soviet authorities could not resist
currying favour with the Persians at our expense. On tihe 25th May, the Soviet
Ambassador proposed the immediate release of the remainder; and by the
29th May, the Soviet authorities had already informed the Persian police that
they were willing to set free all internees, but that the British authorities
opposed their release. On the 2nd June, therefore, His Majesty’s Ambassador
informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the British security authorities
desired the detention of those internees only who might be a danger to the
countries at war with Japan. Thereupon thirty-one more internees were released.
The Soviet Embassy then published a statement in the press that they were not
opposed to the release of any of the internees. The Soviet Ambassador also
informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs accordingly, and, having ascertained
the names of those whom the British authorities wished to keep interned,
emphasised that he considered desirable the release of the Mullah Ka^hani, and
General Aghevli (whom the British authorities regarded as especially dangerous).