خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎١‎٧] (٢٤٨/٣٤)

4
without British troops by some sort of police force. This continued
to be debated. At the beginning of June the War Office asked the
General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Paiforce, whether, in his
opinion, the Persian oil-fields could be reasonably well protected
against sabotage and disturbances, of internal security, if all British
troops were withdrawn from Persia, by some such arrangement as the
employment of the Persian army or ttie use of an armed and trained^"
civilian police force. He was also asked whether the mobile force
could be held in Iraq to re-enter the oil-fields if necessity arose. The
General Officer Commanding, showed the political, strategic and
climatic objections to the retention of the mobile force in Iraq, and on
the other question he quoted probable American objections to our
entrusting the protection of the oil to Persians and to our removing
troops before they had had time to dispose of their assets
advantageously, and he pointed out that hurried evacuation would
probably mean great loss to His Majesty’s Government in the price
to be obtained for our assets. His conclusion was : if South Persian
oil was vital in the war against Japan, then although sabotage in the
oil-field was easier said than done and, although security was good at
the moment, it was considered essential to retain British/Indian
troops in Abadan and desirable to retain our troops in the oil-fields
and the reserve brigade in Persia.
13. On the question of the replacement of British/Indian troops in the oil
area by a British/Indian armed police force the General Officer Commanding-in-
chief calculated that 3,000 would be required, but that if as appeared preferable
Abadan was guarded by soldiers, the oil-fields would require 2,000 police. It was
agreed by all concerned that the more the Persian authorities could be associated
with the defence of the oil area the better : they would perhaps work hard to
improve their forces so as to justify us in effecting the maximum withdrawal
possible, and that would make the transfer to peace-time conditions easier, and
help to ensure the protection of the oil area when the British forces had left the
country. This led to an examination of methods of improving the Persian police
and gendarmerie, which was still going on when the quarter came to an end.
British A rmy.
14. The previous report omitted to mention that on the 15th February
Paiforce ceased to be an independent command and came under the Middle East
Command.
15. During the quarter under review the number of British combatant
troops in Persia remained at about 10,200 men.
Proposed Counter-Measures against Soviet Pressure.
16. In April the Foreign Office asked whether more could be done to
prepare against further Soviet pressure on Persia, since the Russians might
return to the charge at short notice. The standard Soviet complaints against any
Government which they wished to subvert were (1) that its failure to maintain
order was a threat to Soviet security; (2) that it was “ Fascist ” and needed to
be replaced by a “ democratic ” Government representing the will of the people.
The Russians might well claim that their interests were threatened by disorders
in Azerbaijan or Tehran. And it was difficult to maintain that present Persian
Governments represented public opinion. In case the Soviet Government tried to
confront them with a fait accompli, His Majesty’s Government should be ready
to make firm representations at short notice and to explode any Soviet claim that
their own nominees represented public opinion any better. The Foreign Office
asked, first, that this embassy should supply notes on Persians whom the Russians
might be nursing for this purpose, which notes could be quoted to the Russians.
Secondly, they asked for a list of the more notorious cases in which the Russians
had prevented the Persian Government from keeping order, by interfering with
the latter’s proposed security measures. Thirdly, this embassy must maintain
pressure on the Shah and Persian Government to carry out social reforms.
Another very important factor was publicity (since wide advertisement of the
difference between Russian professions and Russian actions was apt to put the
Russians off their stroke). This point is discussed in the next section.
Reluctance of Anglo-Saxon Press to Publish News of Nefarious Soviet Activities
in Persia.
17. One of the troubles of this embassy is that nearly all foreign publicity
about Persia is pro-Soviet. (This was particularly noticeable last autumn when