خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٨] (٢٤٨/١٦)

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furthermore, any action taken for evacuation before then would arouse the
gratitude of the Persian nation.
35. The departure from Tehran of British combatant troops began on the
12th September. Suddenly and without warning the Russians withdrew their
troops from Qaleh Murgeh airfield and barracks on the night of the
18th-19th September—leaving them in filthy condition. Intourist personnel,
however, remain, and the existing Russian airlines to and within Persia continue,
serviced by ground staff pretending to be civilian. The Russians continue to hold
the northern railway, and at Tehran railway station they keep a considerable
number of employees, some in uniform. They also retain in Tehran about forty-
five houses, some of them containing uniformed personnel.
36. British Airways’ final flight from Tehran took place on the
29th September.
37. On the 30th September the Foreign Office telegraphed the decision of
the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Persia, taken on the 22nd September.
It was to the following effect:—
The council noted that letters had been exchanged between Mr. Bevin
and M. Molotov and agreed that there was now no need for the withdrawal
of troops from Persia to be discussed by the present conference.
38. The following is a summary of the letters referred to :—
(1) Mr. Bevin to M. Molotov, dated the 19th September.—Since it was
decided at Potsdam that the further stages in the withdrawal of
Allied troops from Persia should be discussed by the Council of
Foreign Ministers, the situation has been changed by the end of the
Japanese war. Our two Governments will now withdraw their forces
from Persia by the 2nd March, 1946, six months after the Japanese
armistice, and all we need do is to ask the council to note this date.
I further propose to suggest that, when the question comes up, our
two Governments shall agree that by the middle of December, 1945,
their respective forces shall be withdrawn from the whole of Persia
except that until the 2nd March, 1946, British forces may remain in
the southern oil area to the south of and including Andimeshk, and
Soviet forces may remain in Azerbaijan.
(2) M. Molotov to Mr. Bevin, dated the 20th September.—The decision
regarding the withdrawal of troops from Tehran has already been put
into effect from the Soviet side. As regards the complete withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Persia, the Soviet Government consider that
this should be effected within the period laid down in Anglo-Soviet-
Persian Treaty. If necessary, the final withdrawal of Soviet and
British troops from Persia could be discussed between us towards
the end of that period. The Soviet Government accordingly see no
need for this question to be discussed in the Council of Foreign
Ministers.
39. In a subsequent exchange of letters Mr Bevin reiterated his view that
the final date for withdrawal was the 2nd March, 1946, and the Soviet Foreign
Minister replied reiterating the importance which his Government attached to
the strict fulfilment of obligations (thus evading any commitment as to the actual
date of the withdrawal).
40. The Foreign Office at the same time instructed the embassy to
communicate the text of the council’s decision to the Persian Government, with
reference to their note of the 9th September. The embassy were not to com
municate the substance of the exchange of letters for the present.
A nglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.
41. On the 2nd July, His Majesty’s Embassy suggested to the Foreign
Office that the political censorship on press messages from Persia might now be
abolished, and that the Russians should be asked to agree. The American
Ambassador was also telegraphing to his Government in this sense. The British
military authorities had no objection provided no information about numbers
and movement of troops, &c., was sent out. The embassy added that the censor
ship was based on article 3 (ii) (d) of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty and was
intended to protect the communications mentioned in 3 (ii) (b). Article 3 (iii)
required that in the working of the censorship full consideration should be given
to the essential needs of Persia. The needs of Persia, in the view of the embassy,
required that both sides of the internal political question should be presented