خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٦] (٢٤٨/١٢)

4
however, with no response or provoked a series of counter-accusations to the effect
that Persian officials and police were inciting anti-Soviet activities. An article
by an ex-Tudeh member in a Tehran newspaper accusing the Russians of trans
forming the Azerbaijan ludeh party into the new Democratic party called forth
i a violent protest from the Russian Ambassador, who demanded an explanation,
to be submitted to M. Molotov, within twenty-four hours. The Soviet “war of
| nerves was, in fact, in full swing at the end of the period under review.
Tribal Situation.
14. The tribal situation during the past three months has given the Persian
Government little or no anxiety for Kurdistan. In Southern Kurdistan operations
around Merivan and in the Avroman area have been undertaken to punish
Mahmud Khan Kanisenani for his attack on Merivan, to show the flag and to
collect arms. Little has been achieved though the equivalent strength of two
Persian divisions has been engaged. The Kinds have taken refuge 1 2 3 in difficult
terrain on the Iraqi frontier and the approach of winter will bring the operations
to a close without an\ result having been achieved. The ill success of the Iraqi
army in the early stages of its operations against Mulla Mustafa Barzani has
certainly emboldened the Persian Kurds. There is some talk of a Persian Govern
ment commission being sent to Kurdistan to effect a settlement. If military officers
of the Reza Shah school can be eliminated from its ranks, and if the commission
sets about its task in the belief that the ti ibes of Persia have common rights to
educational, medical and economic benefits and to a reasonable share in local
Government employment, something may be achieved.
15. Northern Kurdistan, though not recently the scene of any military opera
tions, is potentially the more dangerous area in that the Russians have encouraged
both Tudeh activities and the Komala or Kurdish Autonomy party, the full effects
of which cannot yet be assessed. A party of Kurdish chieftains was recently
taken to Baku by the Soviet authorities, but it is not known whether the Kurds
are being asked to support a separatist movement for Azerbaijan or whether
Kurdish autonomy in additions is implied.
16. From other tribal areas there is nothing of interest to report.
Withdrawal of A Hied Troops.
17. On the 10th July the Foreign Office set fortfi His Majesty’s Govern
ment s aims regarding the withdrawal of Allied troops. Their object was to relax
Persia and, if possible, to get all Russian troops out
of Persia before the date prescribed by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty (i.e., six
months after the armistice with Japan). His Majesty’s Government had already
proposed to the Russians simultaneous withdrawal by stages and military dis
cussions to work out details, but had had no reply. It seemed clear that the
Russians did not wish to withdraw their forces in the near future. They probably
hoped by remaining to get so firm a hold in North Persia that they could establish
their domination over the Persian Government. If they were successful the
consequences for His Majesty’s Government and their imperial interests in South
Persia would be most serious. His Majesty’s Government intended to propose at
the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam, that British and Soviet
forces should withdraw simultaneously from the Tehran district on an agreed
date. Our only hope of dislodging the Russians lay in cur readiness to withdraw
British troops. We had no other form of pressure except to confront the Russians
with the alternatives of withdrawal simultaneously with us or of beim>- shown
up publicly to Persia and to the outside world as the Power responsible for per
petuating foreign occupation of Persia. WJ? could not be certain that the
Russians would choose the alternative we desired but there was a reasonable
chance that they might.
18. At Potsdam His Majesty’s Government circulated a memorandum to
the other delegates of which the following is a summary :—
The time had now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from
Persia. His Majesty’s Government proposed three stages :—
(1) British and Soviet forces to withdraw completely from Tehran at once
(2) British troops would then be withdrawn to Abadan and the southern
oilfield area and Soviet troops to a zone in either north-east or north
west Persia.
(3) British and Soviet troops would then be withdrawn from Persia
altogether.