مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٤‎٠‎٢] (١٠٣١/٨٠٣)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT ^ ^
V — — /9 A4v-t To •
IRAQ.
CONFIDENTIAL
With the ComplimaShts ^
of the
Under Secretary of Stats
for Foreign Affaire
April 7, 1941.
[E 1317/1/93]
Section 1.
23 APR 194V b . Ojp'j ,
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firth m 1
*SzV /?. Newton to Mr. Eden. —i(Rgggt‘ 4^pil JiL)
ft fW.
Copy No. 9()
(No. 87. Very Confidential.)
Sir, Bagdad, February 27, 1941.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from
Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, in which he gives an
interesting and informative account of the political events which led up to the
resignation of Rashid Ali-al-Gailani on the 31st January.
2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador in
Cairo.
I have, &c.
BASIL NEWTON.
Enclosure.
Mr. Edmonds to Sir B. Newton.
(Secret.)
My dear Ambassador, Bagdad, February 15, 1941.
IN December I began to write you a letter carrying down to the end of the
year, from the point where I left it in my letter dated the 1-Oth October, my
appreciation of the effects of the progress of the war on the political situation
in Iraq, but the accelerating temyo of the ministerial crisis left me no leisure to
complete it. This crisis came to an end on the 1st February, 1941, and it might
seem a waste of time to go over again, at this late date, the familiar events of the
last four months. But it may nevertheless be useful, for purposes of future
reference if nothing better, to put down some of my ideas about them and about
the factors that were at work.
2. In my letter of the 10th October I expressed the opinions :—
(ft) That, starting from the last days of August, the policy of the Cabinet
in so far as it was influenced by the Palestine grievance, would be
found to have taken on a more reckless and vindictive form than
heretofore;
(&) That Ministers had not yet recovered from the state of trepidation into
which they had been thrown by the events of June, and that eccentric
behaviour was still to be expected for some time, unless spectacular
victories in Europe or Africa were to come to restore their balance;
(c) That the Cabinet, though disunited and doomed by all the rules to early
demise, was nevertheless likely to be kept alive for some time by the
difficulty of finding a practicable alternative; and
(^) That nothing much more than a lukewarm implementation of the alliance
was to be expected from any Iraqi Cabinet, at any rate until we were
on the crest of an unmistakable wave of success.
The developments of the last four months can conveniently be considered
under these four heads :—
(A)
3. The events of October revolve round the person of Naji Shawkat, the
Minister of Justice. He had left for Istanbul early in Sep tern be r 11 fdr"reason s
of health,” tihough even before his departure was announced it was rumoured
that he would be going there in order to get in touch with the Axis Powers. On
the 24th October the Arabic press reproduced a declaration of sympathy with
Arab aspirations broadcast on the German wireless. On the 28th" October Naji
Shawkat returned to Bagdad. It was widely believed that it was he who had
REC». POL. DEPt.
25APR 941
INDIA OFFICF
W WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 1 7
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