مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٣‎٩‎٩] (١٠٣١/٧٩٧)

Hrfei±—
lI^y^^OUTWAHn TELEGRAM fS
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and should be
Indexed
kept under Lock and Key.]
E fC^h/G.
[Cypher],
No: 516 .
22nd April, 1941.
DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET) ,
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD.
if ?
1
D: 5.40 p*m. 22nd April, 1941.
r
Repeated to Governnent of India.
No: 4559. ..
BmDIATE.
MOST SECRET.
—
(°7
Your telegrams Nos: <357) and 358) [of April 18. Iraq].
Following, for your own most secret information only,
are replies to questions which you raise.
2. General policy of His Majesty’s Government.
Our chief interest in sending troops to Iraq is the
covering and establishment of a great assembly base at
Basra, and what happens up-country, except at Habbaniya,
is at the present time on an altogether lower priority.
Our rights under the Treaty were invoked to cover disembarkation
of troops and to avoid bloodshed, but force would have been
used to the utmost limit to secure the disembarkation if
necessary. Our position at Basra is of course covered by
Article 4 of the Treaty, but it also may be regarded as a
new event arising out of the war. No undertaKings can be
given that troops will be sent northwards or moved through
ro Palestine, and the right to require such undertakings
I should not be recognised in respect of a,Government which
has in itself usurped power by a coup d’etat, or in a country
' where our Treaty rights have so long oeen frustrated in
the spirit. Explanations had better in any case be avoided as
far as possible in dealing with Iraqi authorities.
3.
Basra.
Troops which have arrived in Iraq will remain at
4. Intention is that second brigade shall sail from
India second week in May. Third brigade will follow some
time in June. Final decision has not yet been taken regarding
disposal of these further troops. It is possible that some
may be stationed at Habbaniya, and some pass through to
Palestine or Trans Jordan where they would remain as a striking
force if required. Much will depend upon the views of
General Officer Commanding Basra regarding the number of
troops required to ensure security of base there. Question
will not arise till arrival of further troops, and you
should in the meantime consult with General Fraser, bearing in
mind that security of base at Basra and of air station at
Habbaniya must have priority over passage of troops through to
Palestine.
5. Please see also my immediately following telegram.