مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٣‎٧‎٤] (١٠٣١/٧٤٨)

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As to the question of upholding the rights of the nation and of the legislature,
with which rights certain quarters and forces have, it is said, been interfering,
we all know that Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary State in which affairs
cannot proceed properly unless equilibrium is maintained between the legislative
and executive powers. All of us are, however, aivare of the fact that all the
higher quarters and forces in the State have acted together for the suppression of^
Parliament and the rights of the people and have sought to deny Parliament all
opportunity properly to carry out its mission of representing the people. As a
result that authority, which we had intended to establish as the “ supreme
authority and arbitrator in the State ” has beconfe ineffective. Successive Iraqi
Governments, including the present Government, failed to think of restoring to
the legislative power its prestige and influence. Unless that power has its prestige
and prerogatives restored to it, we shall never he secure against other Powers
interfering and controlling the affairs of the State, as the case is at present. On
the contrary, we shall have to expect such interference from all sorts of quarters as
may choose to interfere. There has already been interference of this kind by
armed tribes, which was followed by similar interference by another armed force
which came to strike those tribes. If we wish to remove this second force from
the field, we must set up in its stead another force—that of the people. Unless
the Legislature is accorded its right of self-defence, whereby a balance of powers
will be established in the State, some other force is bound to emerge and take over
control of the affairs of the State by constitutional or other means.
Responsible men should, therefore, consider the setting up of a “popular
force ” to uphold the Legislature, acting as supreme controlling authority over
the Government and doing what is necessary in the interest of the country.
This is all the information I have to give to the House to show the good
intentions I and my colleagues had. If we have erred in any respect, well different
people take different views of things, and everyone has his own views.
Jalal Baban.
I must thank his Excellency A1 Suwaidi for the explanations he has made,
for these explanations afford us opportunity to speak.
I do not deny that it is necessary to act together and oppose unjustifiable
foi eign demands and also to assume before the foreigner the attitude of one who
is sti'ong and independent. On the other hand, we must not forget that it is
equally necessary to ensure good understanding and keep the way open for the
purpose as may be necessary in the interest of the country. If we review the
political histoiy of nations, we shall find manv instances of a Cabinet bavin 01
been changed to ensure understanding sought in the interest of the country
concerned
As regards the proceedings of the former Cabinet, I do not wish to deal
with this subject at great length. I would, therefore, begin from a certain point
namely, that Sunday meeting of the Cabinet at which his Excellency A l Hashimi
spoke, declaring: “It has become necessary for us to resign, our continuing in
office having become detrimental to the public interestP This declaration by
his Excellency Al Hashimi was received with approval by all his colleagues
Subsequently, the Cabinet, with the exception of its chief, decided to resign
Taking this event as a starting-point, l may now continue. Following on the
Cabinet's decision to resign, we saw a new chapter open at sunset and close at
sunrise on the following day. With the close of that chapter a further painful
one was opened. It was a chapter to be deplored by all Iraqis, for with it we
reverted to the errors of the past, which we much needed avoiding. But how
could those errors of the past be avoided, when some ones, as we have seen,
would not hesitate for a moment to take any action agreeable to their own desires
no matter how harmful such action might be for the State.
These sufferings began with the event of the m,h October, 1936, known as
the military coup d Etat, and the disastrous and unfortunate acts which
characterised that event, such as hangings and martial law. The army was
innocent of that event. I say so although I was abroad at the time. On my return
home I made enquiries and found that the army was innocent of that coup d'Etat
which was a painful movement undertaken by a handful of individuals acting
for the furtherance of their purely individual aims. The movement, which had
nothing to do whatever with the public interest, was unfortunately’ascribed to
the army.