مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٢‎٩‎٦] (١٠٣١/٥٩٢)

to hand over their keys the authorities would open the banks by force. After
consulting with myself and the adviser to the Ministry of the Intel ior, the two
managers in the embassy decided to authorise their representatives in the United
States Legation to hand over their keys under protest in the face of force
majeuve. Whether the surrender of the keys actually took place I was unaware,
as no contact existed between His Majesty’s hmbassy and the l nited
Leo-ation. Details of the manner in which this action was taken, and of the
situation of the banks under the control of Rashid All’s Administration, will be
reported in a separate despatch.
26. The 4th May was a second eventful day. In the early morning
Wellington bombers were seen from the embassy dropping leaflets over the city.
Shortly afterwards an official in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs telephoned to
tell a member of my staff that these leaflets contained a threat that the Govern
ment offices in Bagdad would be bombed unless the Iraqi forces were withdrawn
from Habbaniya within four hours. The official said that he had been instructed
to inform the embassy that the Iraqi forces would not be withdrawn and that, if
the Government offices in Bagdad were bombed, the Iraqi Air Force would
retaliate by bombing all places inhabited by the British. This, of course, was
tantamount to a threat to bomb His Majesty’s Embassy and the United State*
Legation, where so many British subjects were congregated, and constitutes a
further example of the flagrant disregard by the Iraqi authorities of interna
tional law and custom. This message was afterwards confirmed in a note from
the Ministry. . « T i i j
27. The threat made in these leaflets came as a surprise, for I had under
stood that all ideas of bombing other than military targets had been dropped.
I had already made it clear by telegram to the British military authorities on
1 st May that I was strongly opposed to such action. As I saw it, the bombing
of the'Government offices would have united public opinion throughout Iraq
against us, and aroused the fury of the Bagdad mob without in an\ wa\ alteimg
the militarv situation at Habbaniya. I therefore addressed an urgent telegram
to the Air Officer Commanding,' Middle East, the Air Officer Commanding.
Habbaniya. and the General Officer Commanding, Basra, recalling my opinion
that the bombing of civilians was undesirable. This telegram was sent off en
clair through the Iraqi civil telegraph office.
28. Hardly had this action been taken- before a police inspector arrived at
the embassy gates with a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs asking that
all Iraqi subjects within the embassy should be expelled and handed over to the
inspector in charge of the police guard. It mav have been that the Iiaqi
authorities were anxious to withdraw Iraqis from the danger zone of the
British Embassv in case it were to be bombed, but I feared that the underlying
purpose of this'request was to get hold of all the Iraqi servants and to victimise
them for having served the British, and I decided to reject it. A member of my
staff discussed the matter with the Ministry by telephone, making my attitude
clear, and was then informed that the reason for the request was that the wives
of some men employed in the embassy had petitioned the Ministry, alleging that
their menfolk were being forcibly detained and asking for their release. When
it was explained that all Iraqis'were free to leave, if they wished to do so, the
Ministry were satisfied with a list of their names. I have a feeling, however,
that the demand would have been pressed had it not been for the timely bombing
of the military camps near Bagdad that morning.
29. The'next event was the unexpected arrival of M. Ustum, my Turkish
colleague. He came to acquaint me with bis Government’s offer of good
offices to find a solution of the dispute between Great Britain and Iraq. He also
told me that he had been invited by the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to
suggest that it was desirable that the action threatened in the leaflets dropped
earlier in the morning should at all events be postponed so as to enable the Turkish
offer to be considered in a favourably atmosphere. I showed him a copy of my
telegram about bombing civilians, but explained that as I was cut off from all
confidential communication with my own Government I was unable to express to
them my views concerning the Turkish Government’s offer. This visit, however,
gave me the opportunity of explaining to M. Ustum the various humiliations
to which His Majesty’s Embassy was being subjected, with the request that his
Government should be fully informed. Forty-eight hours later M. Ustum paid
me another visit, complaining that he was unable to withdraw certain funds from