مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٤] (١٠٣١/٥٨٧)

)
FILE COPY
direct
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BR]
TANNJ;^ wt^JE^TY’S
^ J 4
SoyeITRment
With the Com pi imp!
of the HO* 5
^IRAQ. Under Secretary of 3
for Foreign Affair
**4238
tatt ^ q 4 -j June
^ ' 7
30. 1941.
M '■ A
r^O
/ a.,
tt.O.
CONFIDENTIAL.
I'U;
Section 1.
1
[E 3426/1/93] V-© UT^ / ^Vf)^ AtU^S * ^
Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 30.)
Copy No.
97
(No. 148.)
Sir, Bagdad, June 6 , 1941.
*oSk> WITH reference t o my despatch No. 143 of the 28th April, I have the honour
to submit the followingTeport on events in Iraq from the arrival in Basra in the
middle of April of the first convoy of British troops from India down to the
signing of the armistice between the British and Iraqi forces on the 31st May.
2. So soon as the troops had disembarked, Rashid Ali began to press hard
for the full recognition of the new regime by His Majesty’s Government and the
early movement of the newly arrived British forces along the lines of communica
tion which they had come to open. I made it clear that His Majesty’s Government
would not give full recognition until the new Government had shown by their
acts that they were really friendly, explaining that full discretion must be given
to the General Officer Commanding to organise the lines of communication in
accordance with military requirements. This second point was also discussed
with the Iraqi Chief of General Staff by the General Officer Commanding, Basra,
when he visited Bagdad on the 23rd April. He emphasised the need of time for
the proper organisation of a base, and explained that a battalion of British troops
was being flown from Basra to Habbaniya. He also told the Chief of General
Staff of the probable arrival within a few days of a few more ships carrying men
belonging to the formation which had already disembarked. The Chief of
General Staff received this news well, but urged that something should be done
quickly to show that we had no idea of keeping troops permanently at Basra.
3 . On the 25th April, acting on your instructions, I called on the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and informed him that, in view of Rashid Ali’s friendly
assurances regarding his general policy and of the co-operation shown by the
Iraqi authorities in connexion with the landing of our troops at Basra, I had
been authorised to enter into formal relations with the new Administration forth
with. I added that I had your authority to express the hope that further
co-operation by the Iraqi Administration might provide evidence of their desire
to fulfil the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance and thereby soon enable formal relations to be
established.
4. Musa Shahbandar expressed his friendship for Great Britain and pro
mised to use all his efforts to bring about an improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations.
He pressed hard, however, for early and full recognition and for the quick passage
through Iraq of the troops which had been landed at Basra. He also spoke of
the harm that had been done to our mutual relations by our failure to reassure
the Arabs about the future of Palestine. An official communique on my call was
published the following morning in the press. The key-note of the newspaper
articles at this time was that, though Iraq would honour her word by allowing
British troops to pass through Iraq, the Government were ready and determined
to resist any attempt to violate the country’s sovereignty and independence.
5 . In the meanwhile the Iraqi reinforcements, which had been sent to Basra
at the time of the arrival of the first convoy of British troops, were being with
drawn to Musayib and Bagdad, and one infantry brigade and one artillery
brigade were brought down to Bagdad from Kirkuk.
6 . The deduction to be made from these movements seemed to be that the
Iraqi military commanders had given up any idea of holding Basra, but were
taking steps to be in a position to see Bagdad securely under their control and to
act against Habbaniya, if they wished to do so.
7 . On the 28th April I sent my counsellor to the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to give notice of the impending arrival at Basra of three ships carrying
about 2,000 men (of whom some 1,600 were non-combatant) belonging to the units
and formations which had already arrived. About noon I received a message by