مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٢‎٥‎٢] (١٠٣١/٥٠٣)

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present mixed foroe 0 This was shovm by the superior fighting
qualities of the police at Basra last Mayo In expressing the
loregoing views I am not unmindful of the fact that the Iraqi
army is a costly luxury* No doubt were we in effective control
of the country and supported by sufficient force to maintain it we
could solve tnis problenp to the benefit of the people as a whole
and to. our own.satisfaction® But as we are not in control and
cannot take over the country .and as our own forces are limited
we must take account of political realities and one [grp. undecs*
? supposition] is that rightly or wrongly many people in Iraq,
as m other newly established countries, regard" their amy as
outward and visible sign of national independence®
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(b) Iraqi Government c
I have paid particular attention to this matter since
last June® Bu::- well disposed men of proved ability are hard
to find® Prime Minister has to my knowledge twice this year
offered a portfolio^ to Ibrahim Kemal who refused. The
inclusion of a hostile^minister however capable he may be is
mpre likely to weaken than strengthen the Cabinet, The Prime
Minister is thinking of making certain changes which if they
can^be arranged should improve the position of the Cabinet.'
Administration in t general has been going steadily downhill
for 8 years and will take a long time to improve. I hope to
secure the appointment of three British police officers shortly.
(c) Tducation.
Professor^Hamley informs me that he has had very satisfactory
conversation with the Prime Minister and other responsible
Iraqis® Reports about the Military Schools have I consider
been exaggerated® Mr® Morrison who lectures in them is of
this opinion while two British officers who have just spent
a month in camp with the military college cadets came away with
favourable impressionso I forward a copv of their report
when received®
(d) Fifth Column.
Internment camps are at present full but a larger camp at
Amarah will be finished shortly® All internees will be
concentrated there and the Prime Minister informs me that on
completion further arrests are to be made. The Prime Minister
has also assured me that he has a long list of people whom he
will^intern onthe first signs of a threat against Iraq. All
hostile elements are at present lying very low but there are a
number who undoubtedly should be interned® Our intelligence
organisations are considering,in consultation with me, against
how many it is necessary to proceed at the present moment. I
do not think that a visit by a body of expert policemen under
someone like Sir Keown Boyd would help® We already have
all.the necessary information and such a body could not impress
the Iraqis > owing to its ignorance of local conditions and
personaIntieSc I must emphasise that though there are certain
suspects about whose guilt we and the Iraqis differ, and about
whom the British experts themselves differ, the policy of Iraqi
Government/