مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎١] (١٠٣١/٥٠٢)

\
♦
i *
r* •v'l
• ^
reforms and action would be
witl:
1 r»
■oat^
easy but we have to act in
nd if we drive any cabinet too
uirow its hand in and oresent spirit
accordance
hard it
of co-operation
would like to do our iz is nevertneiess signiiicant tm-
in spite of certain glaring defects of Iraqi Government
and adverse influences within and without, 'the situation
steadily turns in our favour.
will mere 1.7
will be lost. There is much that 1
but it is nevertheless significant
t
paragraphs
5. I make the following comments on other
of your telegram under reference:
r- V-M* e 1 ^
- j ra qi /^niy was proposed in my
and approved generally in your
unaec, j. . If* was and is in my opinion
(a) Iraqi
The
gram
/i
‘din;
0 O 11 C t , *X KJQU.J. 'X-L i-Ui,
n o. 1265 of 194.1 n
tele gram No. [-gr. .7 IcT].
^^^np-the only policy which in the existing circumstances holds
' any chance of success. Fran reports received from officers
of the British Military
progress,
Our
are tfr^ated
hold n
ask why, if it ±1
given no indieat"
oiiicer,
spirit
Mission it
j are being
of confidence
appears to be
made
full use
making
of rand
ana
special brief for Iraci hrnv but i
two members of Golden
prorPi-ap 1 a s. .ha £
of its feelings
S uare and
iter
friendship. I
J o is pertinent to
been suggested, it has
during the trial of
their execution.
One would have expected at lea
during that protracted period but I
single report. I cannot believe t
no doubt] especially in^junior ranks, it
considerable cleaning. As regards de
t some signs of unrest
did not receive a
at as a whole it is
thirsting for revenge against ns although [grp. undec. 0
still
requires
_ ‘ee of its trust
worthiness especially in the face of a German attack, army
commander is more qualified to judge than I, but certainly
he and I arc under no illusions on the subject. • Question
of Bagdad garrison has been solved by
camp and one of tv/o brigades now here will shortly be
transferred. Our policy has been to try and restore the
self respect of Iraqi army and inspire it with a desire to
defend its country. Your proposal to reduce it to five
brigades means in effect an abrupt reversal of this policy
which would I fear have widespread repercussions on our
~j u• ■ a ues uien
S o ' 1 ,0 0 + r\y^c\ v
i am
relations with Iraq,
accept it nor could any one e
it tnrough. Even if wc were
certain
t Nuri
would never
.so be found who could push
able to force it on 'some
submissive Ministers we could expect no co-operation from
the reduced remnant and we would-provide an obvious target
for hostile propaganda. Abolition of conscription would
of course bo popular but conscription does not" at present
weigh heavily oh the population and I believe that" only
5,000 conscripts are being taken this
an army composed entirely of recruits
class] asked [sic] would I fear if it
influence of subversive propaganda be
year. In any event
[ grp. undec.? of the
fell under the
a greater menace than
present/