مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٧] (١٠٣١/٤٥٤)

their physique is on the whole good. However unpopular conscription may be,
the men, at all events, seem happy and contented once they are in the army. The
improvement seen in the conscripted recruits after two months is most marked,
due largely to good feeding. There is a great deal of really good material in the
ranks. But although they may feel that they are more than a match for anyon^^
iunder favourable conditions, morale must inevitably be affected by their shortag^^
of transport and modern equipment. Given this morale would be not merely good
but excellent.
3. Attitude.
(a) Like other Eastern nations, the Iikqis are first and foremost pro-
Iraqi. Friendship with Britain, if adopted, is only because the Iraqis feel they
must for the present have some supporting Power. On the*other hand, friendship
with Britain’s enemies would be merely a means of disposing of the Power that
at the moment has the closest hold in Iraq in exchange for another from whom
more favourable conditions might be obtained. The Iraqis know that at present
they cannot stand alone. The degree to which the British will be those whom
they support depends on a number of factors which I set out below. These affect
the army as much as the civil population.
(5) Coupled with Nationalist pro-Iraqi sentiment there is possibly a slight
sentiment even in the army towards a Pan-Arab movement. Its only danger is if
exploited by Britain’s enemies.
(c) On the other hand, even Iraq itself is not a united nation. Arabs, Kurds,
.Sunnis, Shias, Armenians, Assyrians and Jews, not to mention Bagdadis and
Mosulawis are divided by so many racial, religious and other distinctions that
rivalry and jealousy always exist. This is responsible for a mass of reports,
seldom disinterested and often entirely false. It has reached such a stage that to
denounce a rival or enemy is almost a national sport, with the result that many
officers of the army have been included in various Intelligence reports both as
absolutely pro-British and extremely pro-Nazi.
What seldom appears in Intelligence reports is the motives that lead up to
any stated Iraqi’s attitude. The fact that most unit interpreters and the staff
of so many British messes, canteens, coffee shops and local hotels are almost
entirely Armenians, Assyrians and Jews is undoubtedly responsible for many
prejudiced reports.
(d) From the Germans the Iraqis have had a lot. First and foremost, genuine
friendship from a small but skilful band of Germans under Herr Doktor Grobba.
Not just a few “sticky ’’ tea parties and a few organised “ set-piece ’’ entertain
ments, but genuine social intercourse. Such few Germans as were here were
“ good mixers,” in marked contrast to the British insularity and aloofness.
Moreover, when the British were talking and promising goods at some
distant date, the Germans were able to, and actually did, supply goods and equip
ment, and did so without haggling over the price. Why shouldn’t they, as if they
win the war they get it all back and more. As a result of deliveries actually
received from Germany and those arranged from elsewhere by Germany, including
Turkey, Vichy, Syria, Italy earlier on, and from Japan (regarded for long as an
Axis Power), German promises were regarded with good favour. Added to this
a long tale of unparalleled success on land, and it is scarcely to be wondered at
that a nation whose seaboard is limited to the head of the Persian Gulf should
accept German propaganda at its face value, the more so as British propaganda
was virtually non-existent. But the story now changes.
(e) In May 1941 Iraq received no appreciable help from the Axis, and the
German elements were completely discredited in consequence of the disastrous
failure of the attempted cou'p. Since then the British have secured Persia on one
side and Syria on the other, whilst Turkey is defiant and, in Iraq opinion, likely
to resist any aggression that can at present come about. The Japanese, though
successful, are regarded as an inferior nation and their successes do not offset the
German failure in Russia. The press over a prolonged period has been giving
prominence to British successes and to British views. Our publicity is now good
without being blatant—in fact, the average Iraqi now feels that Germany will
ultimately be defeated. This belief is of primary importance, since orientals
must always be on the winning side: in spite of all their faults and defects, it is
the British who are winning.