مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٨] (١٠٣١/٣٩٦)

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supporters. They thought that they should have some share in the decisions
taken, but opinions varied as to its degree. The Minister of the Interior was,
however, clear-sighted enough to see that, if all Ministers were to protect their
friends, no one would be interned at all. and he in his turn threatened to resign
if such a proposal was adopted. The Prime Minister sought to find a solution
on the basis of an arrangement whereby, though the Minister of the Interior
would retain unimpaired the power to intern anyone whose activities were
harmful, other Ministers would be given lists of the internments ordered on the ^
day on which the orders were carried out. Though no final decision has yet been
reached, his colleagues are for the moment mollified and some procedure of this
kind is likely to be adopted. Meanwhile, the experience has made the Minister
of the Interior shy of further drastic internments. . •
6. The other grievances of the Minister of Finance were assuaged by the
results of a good deal of honest brokering by myself and some straight talking
to the Minister of the Interior. The result was that Ali Mumtaz agreed to
return to his office and resume his work. Another crisis seemed thus to have been
averted, but the hoped-for tranquillity did not supervene and a fresh shock came
only a few days later.
7. On the 19th July Nuri Pasha appointed Abdul Illah Hafidh (Director-
General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance) Minister of Economics, and the
next day Abdul Mahdi, the Minister of Communications and Works, demanded
the immediate appointment of a third Shiah Minister. The religious tenets of
Abdul Illah Hafidh are in doubt, but he is not accepted by the orthodox Shiahs
as belonging to their community, and Abdul Mahdi, ' in pressing for the
appointment of another Shiah, took his stand on the principle accepted when
Nuri Pasha formed his Cabinet in October 1941, that it should include three Shiah
Ministers. Since the resignation of Sadiq Bassam in February there have been
only two, and Abdul Mahdi seems to have feared that the Prime Minister was
about to ignore the accepted principle and fill up his Cabinet with Sunnis. My
intervention again became necessary to save the Cabinet from a fall. The Prime
Minister was angry, Abdul Mahdi was obstinate and Salih Jabr, though ready
at the last resort to be loyal to his chief, gave strong moral support to Abdul
Mahdi. Three days of hard talking in sweltering heat somewhat lessened the
tension. The Prime Minister reaffirmed his acceptance of the principle of three
Shiah Ministers and, tempers having rather surprisingly cooled, both sides
approached the task of finding a suitable candidate for Cabinet office. It was
soon found that there are sadly few Shiahs who .could be considered eligible, and
the choice was quickly narrowed to a very few men. Two alone survived final
examination—Abbas Mahdi, the head of the Royal Diwan, and Abdul Muhsin
Shallash, who was last in the Cabinet in 1929 as a Minister of Communications
and Works. Abbas Mahdi refused to give up his honourable sinecure for the
hurly-burly of active politics, and Muhsin-al-Shallash said that he must first go
to Palestine for medical treatment, but might agree to take office later if his
health permitted. Thereupon the idea of making any further appointments to
the Cabinet, whether Sunni or Shiah, was put aside for the time being, and it
was agreed by all the Ministers that they should carry on as at present until the
mid of August. The Prime Minister quite rightly calls this arrangement a
truce and not a peace, and it seems likely that changes in the Cabinet will become
necessary before long.
8. The internments which started this chain of Cabinet troubles were made
as the result of my urgent and reiterated warnings to the Prime Minister and the
Minister of the-Interior that there were still many people at large who were
dangerously active in the interests of the Axis. On the 24th May I gave the
Minister of the Interior, for his guidance, a list of seventy-five sucn men living
in different parts of the country and urged him to send them to the newly
established internment camp at Amara. A short period of hesitation, followed
by the Prime Minister’s illness, resulted in action being undesirably delayed,
but by much prodding and prompting the Minister was at last persuaded to move!
and during the night of the 5th-6th July over thirty arrests were made. By the
end of the month the total had been raised to fifty-six, and, though a number of
bad men still remained free, the effect on public security was excellent. Malicious
agitation, intrigue and rumour-mongering were sharply checked, and, warned by
the fate of their friends, most of the pro-Nazis who retained their liberty became
careful to do nothing that might cause them to lose it.
9. Another security measure which was put through successfully with the
co-operation of the Iraqi authorities was the rounding-up and despatch to
Palestine for internment of the last of the nationals of enemy or enemy-occupied