مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٨‎٢] (١٠٣١/١٦٣)

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‘S’/r A. Cornwallis to- Mr. Eden. — {Received A pril 19.) V) ff!
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Sir, Bagdad March 28, 1943. ^ (f
IN my despatch No. 24 of the 22nd January, I reported Iraq’s formal
declaration of war on the Axis Powers and her adhesion to the declaration
of the l nited Nations made at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942. This
action seems to have caused noticeable heartburning to neighbouring Govern
ments. Egypt, Syria, Persia and Saudi Arabia all hurriedly took stock of their
respective positions in relation to this event and, though their reactions varied
with their individual circumstances, all apparently felt that Iraq had cleverly
stolen a march on them.
2. In Iraq itself, the first tangible fruits of the declaration were a
conditional offer of a small armed force to help Great Britain and a praise
worthy effort to give more effective co-operation in providing grain supplies for
other countries in the Middle East. On the 8th February the Prime Minister
called on me to offer to send a force of a maximum strength of one mixed brigade
to Turkey, if the war should come there, and to detail a second brigade for duty
as garrison troops in Palestine or Syria. As I reported at the time, I do not
believe that service abroad would be well received by either the Iraqi army or
the public, and the political objections to the sending of Iraqi troops to
Palestine or Syria are grave and obvious. I accordingly welcomed your instruc
tions to tell the Prime Minister that, though His Majesty’s Government were
grateful for this offer, they had come to the conclusion that the best help that
the Iraqi army could give was to continue to co-operate in the protection of
military communications in their own country. Nuri Pasha took this decision
in good part, though he maintained, as was only to be expected, that I was at
fault in thinking that service outside Iraq would be unpopular.
3. Although Nuri Pasha would not commit himself publicly at the time of
Iraq’s declaration of war to help neighbouring countries in respect of cereals,
I made full use of the new situation in pressing home both on him and the
Minister of Finance that it was the duty of the Iraqi Government now that they
were belligerents to take energetic and determined action in order to provide the
barley so sorely needed in Persia and Turkey. After constant representations
a notification was eventually published on the 13th January fixing prices and
establishing Government control over ad sales of barley. The notification was
the Government’s first important endeavour to co-operate more fully on the
economic front and represented a major step towards proper control of cereals,
and stabilisation of cereal prices. The main points were—
(a) In the liwas of Bagdad, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Muntafiq. Kut, Diyala,
Amara and Dulaim the Government required all persons to surrender
any stocks of barley which they held in excess of their own require
ments for food.
{b) The prices fixed were I.D. 19 a ton for grain declared up to the
28th February; I.D. 17 a ton for later declaration up to the.
15th March and I.D. 15 a ton for stocks registered from the
15th March to the 31st March. Unregistered barley found after the
31st March to be confiscated with a nominal payment not to exceed
I.D. 10 a ton.
Even after the Cabinet had agreed to the measures which it embodies for the
control of barley, the publication of the notification was unexpectedly held up
at the last moment owing to the annoyance caused to the Minister of Finance by
some remarks made by the Prime Minister during a debate in the Senate on the
Government’s economic policy. The Prime Minister admitted that the Govern
ment’s action had so far been inadequate and unsuccessful, but promised better
measures in the near future. Salih Jabr felt that these remarks implied a
criticism of his own work as Minister of Finance and left the meeting determined
to resign. So soon as I learnt of this contretemps I saw both Ministers separately
Apd spo ke to each of the folly of breaking up the Cabinet at this juncture. The