مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٦] (١٠٣١/١١)

OONFIDHNTIAI*
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MA
STY’S GOVERNMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
17184
*^-^506/3/93
Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin. (Received \5th January)
(No. 3)
Sir, Bagdad, ^th January, 1947
I have the honour to transmit to you
herewith a political review of events in
Iraq during the year 1946, for the writing
of which I am indebted to the oriental
counsellor, Mr. Perowne.
2. I am sending copies of this despatch
and its enclosure to Cairo, Damascus,
Beirut, Amman, Jedda, the British Middle
East Office, Jerusalem, His Majesty’s
Consular Officers in Iraq, and the Air
Officer Commanding in Iraq.
I have, &c.
F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.
Enclosure
Political Review of Iraq for the Year 1946
I. —General
During 1946 Iraq shone like a good deed
in a naughty world, maintaining peace
within its frontiers, amity with its neigh
bours and cordiality for its ally. Except
for two small incidents—a demonstration
in Bagdad and a strike in Kirkuk—
security has been absolute.
II. —Domestic Affairs
2. When the year opened there was a
general expectation that political life,
stagnant for so long under the exigencies
of war, would revive. It was hoped that,
as the result of the Regent’s public
announcement on 26th December, 1945,
political parties would once more come into
being and that elections would be held in
accordance with a new Electoral Law.
Oppressed by criticism in the Majlis,
Hamdi al Pachachi, then Prime Minister,
• resigned in February and a new Cabinet
was formed by Tawfiq Suwaidi. This
plausible but shifty politician included in
his Cabinet a number of “ new men,’’
which was encouraging; but with one
exception they proved to be enemies of
promise. Far from holding elections,
Tawfiq Suwaidi was unable even to hold
his Cabinet together, though he did
succeed in passing the new Electoral Law.
In order to divert attention from the
anfractuosities of his own intrigues and in
a bid for popularity, Suwaidi removed all
the war-time restrictions on the press and
on public assembly. Irresponsible agita
tors at once took advantage of this. Tawfiq,
seeing that he was unable to get the djin
back into the jar, raised a factitious
clamour regarding treaty revision. This
evoked remarkably little response from the
general public; so, finding his store of
political nostrums exhausted, Tawfiq
resigned at the end of May, insinuating
that his continuance in power had been
made impossible by the Regent, to whom
Tawfiq is, as His Royal Highness is aware,
disloyal.
3. The choice of a successor was difficult.
Once again efforts were made to form a
genuine caretaker Government whose task
would be to hold elections, and once again
the experiment failed. Arshad al Umari,
formerly Lord Mayor of Bagdad and later
Foreign Minister, became Premier. Most
of his Ministers were men of straw, who
were prepared to leave affairs entirely in
Arshad’s impulsive hands. Arshad had
been a most successful lord mayor and had
improved Bagdad by the same methods of
enlightened dictatorship as the Prince
Regent improved London. But a regime
which can be successfully applied to bricks
and mortar may lead to disaster when
employed on human beings. With
reactionary zeal, Arshad set out to repress
what he conceived to be the licence which
had been stimulated by his predecessor; a
witch hunt of “ reds ” started throughout
the country, editors were prosecuted,
officials discharged and favours distributed
at the sole whim of the Prime Minister.
General resentment was naturally aroused
by this proud and violent behaviour, and
was increasingly directed not only against
the Prime Minister but against the Regent
and this embassy, who were supposed to be
maintaining “the dictator” in power.
Like his predecessor, he attempted to
divert public opinion from his failure. He
85-163