مجموعة ٦/ ٦٦ "المملكة العربية السعودية: حدود السعودية-شرق الأردن" [ظ‎‎٥‎١] (٤٢٧/١٠٢)

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features really lie, and how far those marked on the Hadda map can be identifie ,
and this would involve a new and detailed survey of the whole frontier area on
both sides of the frontier, for which, of course, we should need the co-operation
of the Saudi Government. Hitherto we had been most careful to avoid crossing
into what was recognised as Saudi territory and had, therefore, only carried out a
fragmentary and limited survey on the Transjordan side of the frontier which
was insufficient to establish all the relevant facts.
7 . Secondly, it would be necessary, in our view, to come to some agreement
as to the principles which should be followed in interpreting the line laid down by
the Hadda Agreement in the light of the new situation revealed by the inaccuracy
of the map. For this purpose I suggested that it would be essential to be guided
by the known intentions of the negotiators. You will remember that we had some
discussion as to these intentions, and that I expressed the view that it was clear
that the broad intentions underlying the Hadda settlement were that King Abdul
Aziz should retain the whole of the Wadi Sirhan up to and including Qaf, with
its date gardens and salt pans, and including its projecting edges, to the south
of parallel 31° 25' N.; while it was equally clear that Sir G. Clayton had pressed
for and secured a line running as far to the east and south as it did {i.e., to the
east of the crossing of the Carruthers and Shakespeare tracks, and well to the
south of the Jebel Waila) in order to retain the Jebel Tubeik, and the tracks
passing round to the east and south-east of it, within Transjordan territory.
8 . I suggested that when we had thus established the facts, and agreed about
the broad intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement, a frontier
delimitation commission should be set up to delimit on the ground the nearest
possible approach, in the light of the new information available, to the frontier
which King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton were trying to lay down in the Hadda
Agreement.
9. You did not welcome either of these proposals. You explained that if it
was a question of taking into account the intentions of the negotiators of the
Hadda Agreement, you considered that King Abdul Aziz would have a good claim
to the whole of the hill known as Rashrashiya to the north-west of Qaf, and thus
to the village of Hazim (about which there has already been a good deal of
correspondence between our two Governments), since this was part of the Wadi
Sirhan, and the King’s claim to it had formed the subject of special discussion
during the Hadda negotiations. On this point I felt obliged to say that I had not
seen any record of any such discussion and that, on the contrary," my recollection
was that, when Sir G. Clayton had eventually agreed to the retention of Qaf by
King Abdul Aziz, the concession had been specifically limited to the town of Qaf
with its surrounding date gardens and salt pans. Moreover, the line drawn on
the 1918 map clearly leaves Hazim to Transjordan. You replied to this that the
1918 map equally showed Thaniyya Taraif as in Saudi territory and that, if we
were trying to obtain any adjustment of the frontier in its neighbourhood, your
Government would be willing to consider any such proposals from us, but would
be obliged to claim some equivalent concessions in return. I did not pursue this
suggestion because, in our view, what is required is not so much to introduce any
modifications into the frontier as to establish as accurately as possible on the
ground what that frontier was really intended to be.
10 . You then made two proposals. The first was that the frontier should
be delimited on the ground purely in the light of the description by geographical
co-ordinates, i.e., by latitude and longitude only, as given in article 1 of the Hadda
Agreement.
11 . Alternatively, you suggested that each recognisable feature in the
neighbourhood of the frontier should be allotted to Transjordan or to Saudi
Arabia, as the case might be, simply according to whether it appeared on the
Transjordan or the Saudi side of the frontier as drawn on the 1918 map
irrespective of its true position.
12. The comments I made at the time on these two proposals were as
follows : As regards the first, I explained that, in our view, the specific mention of
the map and the specific reference to the projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan
in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement made it clear that the frontier must be deter
mined, not in the light of latitude and longitude, but as far as possible in relation
to the physical features as shown on the 1918 map. I added that a frontier plotted
solely in the light of geographical co-ordinates would almost certainly be at