"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٩‎٤] (٢٩٤/١٩٢)

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Sabotage of the permanent way was of course the greatest problem.
The simplest form of line obstruction consisted of stones and rocks
piled on one rails by local inhabitants, while more serious were mines
of the same type as those used on the roads. Both were easy to detect
and took time oo instal but called for patrols (sometimes of aircraft)
to loccioe them oefore orpins i/vere allowed to pass. Even more pre
valent and much more dangerous "was the practice of loosening the snikes
and fishplates, which was practically impossible to detect on the move
and resulted in the train spreading the track and becoming derailed.
-his needeo. shilled men vitn special tools but there appeared to be no
lack oi either, and there was evidence that in daylight this form of
sabotage could be completed within ten minutes. Here detection was
almost all that was necessary, since repair could be effected just as
quickly, bu^ it needed much closer patrolling and a system of piloting
trains. Attempts to blow up railway bridges were sufficiently serious
to necessitate the guarding of all those which were both easy to
destroy and aiiiiculu to repair. In most cases Supernumary Police
supplied the guards, and there was no instance in which more than 24
hours’ delay resulted from sabotage of a bridge. Passive defence
measures might have been effective at the other bridges, but those which
were left without guards were either easy to repair or were so difficult
to damage seriously that patrols might well be relied upon to intercept
saboteurs before they could complete their labours.
The Development of the System of Railway Protection
' " ■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■ ■ . ■ ■■ ■ —
The needs of railway protection are perhaps best illustrated by a
brief description of the way in which they developed in Palestine and
the measures which w r ere devised to meet them.
Up to the end of May the only military protection which could be
given was the provision of some infantry guards and patrols detailed by
area commanders, together with patrolling by railway inspection vehicles
under military protection. Night running was stopped in most cases
and speed limits enforced to minimise the effects of undetected sabotage,
while a curfew zone was imposed during the hours of darkness over a
strip of 100 yards on either side of the line. A force of some 35
Supemumary Police and 93 G-haffirs. . under regular police supervision
and assisted by a few military guards, locked after the principal
vulnerable points and kept watch over 17 important bridges. They were
distributed in posts of three and armed with shot-guns.
The arrival of the 42nd Field Company, together with six armed
trolleys, later increased to twelve, manned by an officer and 26 men
of the Royal Horse Artillery, enabled the system of military protection
to be carried a stage further on the 25th.May. Responsioility tor
patrolling the line was then divided between the area commanders at
Haifa and Sarafand, each of whom drew up a nightly programme oi patrols
in consultation with the local railway authorities. In the North
patrolling units consisted of two of the Railway Company’s Drewrp cars
based on Haifa and two locomotive units, one at Haifa and one at
Samakh, each being manned by a section of infantry. In the South ^were
the six R.H.A. trolleys, a Drewry car at Lydda and a locomotive unit
at Jerusalem. As a precaution against accidents bridge guards etc.
were issued with identity discs and armbands and instructed when they
heard a patrol unit approaching to go inside their tenos, at each
which the patrol would stop en route,
A great increase in sabotage soon made more intensive measures
imperative, and on the 6th June military area commanders were relieved
of the responsibility of railway security. Instead a o^ ^ ^
Communication Headquarters” was opened in the railway offices -^-aifa-
under a Lieutenant-Colonel with a small staff; and tne 2nd „n The
Cheshire Regiment together with R.H.A. and R.E. personnel Wao pl^ce