"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [ظ‎‎٨‎٨] (٢٩٤/١٨١)

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In addition to the communications described above there were of
course others which played their part in ,l maintaining the normal lif e
of the country’ 1 , and it was often necessary to resist firmly pressure
from the civil departments to give military protection to non-essential
communications. It is only natural that each department should alwav
want to keep its own particular system in constant operation, knowin?
that once any section is abandoned to the cares of the enemy the co^ts
of repair become cumulative, with the result that in the end a heavv^
bill and a long period of work have to be faced before the section is
again earning any revenue. Hence each department will vie with the
other to secure military protection. The case of the Jerusalem-Hebron
telephone line will serve to illustrate the point: here the Jewish
population had been removed to safer quarters and the government
officials, police and troops were served by wireless; moreover alterna
tive communications were usually available via Gaza. It was therefore"
the Arab population who were the principal sufferers from the consequences
of sabotage, and the employment of troops to prevent it was hardly
justified. Incidentally it was found in practice that a relaxation of
military precautions on this route resulted in the saboteurs turning
their attention more to the routes which were better guarded and there
fore obviously the ones which the military were most anxious to keen
Apart from the professional saboteur, the whole length of these
communications lay open to minor attacks from every Arab village within
comfortable reach, most of which would make it a point of honour to
earn a bad name for the section which ran through their neighbourhood.
T u *
in such circumstances the best cure is plainly some form of
PIPE LIKE PR O TECTION
The Jerusalem Water Supply Line
n-p 4-V^ • U ^ -LH OCX X
ne pipe, and it was fortunate that here