"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٧‎٠] (٢٩٤/١٤٤)

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The employment of the pom-poms and 3-pr. may be summarised under
the following headings
(a) Fire support to striking forces
Gun lorries afiorded projection against snipers while a force
was moving by M.T., gave covering fire for infantry advances
after de-bussing, denied certain ways of escape to the enemy
with harrassing fire, and finally covered the withdrawal of the
troops to their transport and their return by road, which was
usually subjected to heavy sniping. In addition ’’searching"
fire was employed against areas where enemy were believed to be
lying up. It was found that a burst of five rounds was usually
enough to "bolt" any Arabs within some two hundred yards of the
bursts, after which they could be taken on by machine-gunners.
(b) Road protection
Gun lorries, acting in conjunction with armoured cars, carried
out many patrols both by day and night of roads where ambushing
was frequent and where saboteurs were active. These resulted
in a number of actions and undoubtedly accounted for many rebel
casualties. The Arab, secure behind rocks in a well-protected
position, would usually sit tight under rifle or even machine-gun
fire but would always retire immediately shells started to fall
in his vicinity. The guns thus not only had a strong moral
effect, but were also the means of providing good targets for
machine-gunners.
( c ) Protection of Convoys
Gun lorries accompanied most of the convoys through the bad areas
by day. By opening immediate and heavy fire upon any enemy loca
ted on the route they soon succeeded in dispersing ambush parties
and effectively silencing snipers.
(d) In support of picque ts
Gun lorries would escort picquets to the debussing point en route
to their positions, and would then remain on the road to give
covering fire if required until the picquets were in position.
The howitzers, in addition to firing upon snipers overlooking the
camps, were in action on several occasions in support of striking
forces. It cannot be said that their employment was really justified:
their moral value was undoubtedly high, and on one or two occasions
their fire provided effective support when it was possible for them to
co-operate with infantry from the neighbourhood of a road. But ^
generally the country was against them; the guns were less mobile
both on and off the roads than the infantry whom they were supporting,
and suitable targets were seldom presented. There is no douo'o that
pack artillery, equipped with lorry transport for its mules, would have
been far more useful; but even then it is doubtful whether under one
circumstances the light howitzer would have had much more effect than
the infantry mortar or the aircraft bomb. In Palestine both^were
certainly of greater value than mechanised artillery, though it must
be admitted that the latter had little time to adapt itself to loca
conditions before the operations came to an end.
The reasons for this failure of artillery - other than the
latural lack of suitable targets - may be worth analysing.^ liost^oi
bhem are attributable to the nature of the country. In tne^
place the dragons could not keep up with the lorries of the in an ry
striking forces and thus required special escorts. wer ® very
slow on twisty tarmac hill roads and were liable to SKid on the come. ,