"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٤‎٢] (٢٩٤/٨٨)

by "the Force in general^ and. most people preferred to continue the
R.A.F. procedure which was already in universal use in Palestine.
It would seem a pity that a greater degree of standardization in the
signal procedures of the three services has not yet been achieved.
In Palestine the difficulties caused by the variations were most
noticeable •
Ciphers
Until September the ciphers used for internal communication were
the Inter-Service Cipher and a local inter-service code, Reinforcements
from Egypt sometimes arrived with copies of the Egypt Cipher as well.
The Emergency Force from England brought in addition a new Palestine
Cipher. As a consequence of all this, units and formations found
themselves saddled with an embarrassing number of ciphers to look after
and a few facilities for their safe custody - at times Brigade Head
quarters held no less than five different ciphers. This was eased
later by withdrawing the Army and Egypt Ciphers, and the original
inter-service code might well have been replaced altogether by the
Palestine Cipher except for certain local reasons which made it con
venient to retain both. Even this reduction did not satisfy many
officers, who would like to have seen only one cipher in use for internal
communication. It should have been clear that under such conditions
the volume of traffic would have been so great as to supply enough data
to risk compromising the only cipher. Obviously the more ciphers in
use the less will be the risk of any one being broken, and it is pro
bable that each HQ will require at least two - one for upward and one
for downward communication with the possible addition of the Inter-
Service Cipher in some cases. The normal practice in Palestine was to
use the Army Cipher between Divisions and Brigades and the Inter-Service
Cipher "when required for working to the Navy and the R.A.F., the Palestine
Cipher being used below Brigade HQ. Approximately 20 copies of the
latter were provided for each battalion, but for purposes of safe custody
the unit held the least possible number of copies and the remainder were
retained in pools at Brigade and higher headquarters for issue as re
quired. It was found advisable for every detachment, however small,
to hold some sort of cipher. In cases where the local cipher was not
available it was sometimes forgotten that the Field Service Pocket Book
provides an adequate alternative.
It was noticeable on occasions that dilficulties occurred owing to
staff officers failing to keep the cipher staff fully informed of the
situation; and in one case serious confusion arose through a staff
officer ordering a particular cipher to be withdrawn contrary to the
standing instructions of the cipher officers,whom he had not consulted
beforehand. There was also a tendency to misuse the N.C.O. cipher staff
when traffic was light for such duties as Sergeants* Mess Caterer, etc,,
which obvously affected the efficient working oi the system.
It was evident that there was not a general appreciation of the
dangers of compromising ciphers. Instances of referring to cipher
messages by W/T in clear, and even by telephone, were not unknown.
It would seem that a wider knowledge of Section III, Military Security
Instructions 1926, is required by all who may have to initiate or
handle cipher messages.
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN INTERCOMi'.riJNICATluN LESSONS
Operations of the type described in these pages will Uicari-
>th abnormal numbers of signal personnel and wide changes “ the org
.tion and equipment of signal units. These wi vary m >