"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [ظ‎‎٣‎٧] (٢٩٤/٧٩)

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obvious signalling in progress. Had it been possible to open fire on
all signal lights, some innocent people might have been killed, but
equally the lives of some British soldiers might have been saved.-
Ruses
Troop movements were nearly always by K.T. and it was usually
impossible to hide them from the all-seeing eye of the enemy intellig ence
service. The next best thing therefore was to try and deceive it.
Many expedients were tried, but nearly all failed - however well executed
because of a leakage of plans almost at the source* Ruses tried
included the spreading of false news, dropping troops quietly from moving
vehicles at night, the use of "Q 11 buses containing troops disguised as
Jewish passengers or workmen, and the adoption of circuitous routes by
M.T. columns. The latter sometimes achieved a certain amount of success
and where M.T. movements are usually reported to the enemy perhaps the ’
best expedient is to confuse him by the simultaneous movement of several
columns in different directions.
The failure of various ruses in connection with Operation "X" is
described in a later chapter containing an account of that operation.
The main lesson which emerges is that the enemy was so well-informed
that he was extremely difficult to bluff, and in a mainly hostile
country this will probably always be the case.
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
The presence in any unit of an officer with even a smattering of
Arabic proved a great asset, but it was most marked how very few there
were. ^s a rule there will always be a number of regimental officers
and even a few other ranks who are prepared to make a superficial study
o e anguage of the country in which they are stationed, especially
il some small encouragement is offered in the shape of a refund of the
^ 4 - A incurred in return for passing a simple colloquial examination.
prepared to go to the far greater trouble and expense of
. iln ^ .. e ^ ri en ^ language well enough to secure an interpretership.
^ r ^ S 0 ®^P e niences in Palestine in 1936, approval has since been
a J m : ,, award for colloquial Arabic, and there is every
c^t thls . encour agement will justify many times over the small
convertp ^ -P 1 ? ucin & a ^air supply of military personnel who can
converse m simple language with local inhabitants.
Interpreters
barest t JAh™ Und ^ ° ne inter P ret er with each infantry brigade was the
r^uiLnXenob 653 ^' “ d ^ is ^t that one is really
Government offioi AhA" 'd® 3 '*' interpreter is usually a non-native
Antiquities Dent .f 1 ? 36 Work has oea -sed owing to the emergency (e.g.
Martial Law N non ^ i ^ civilian volunteer. Without
services and the ihJA ''" ,as n0 or 2anization for securing their
no^^ble^haran felt - “ ^
was always preferable to “ “ even though inperfect -
good the^latter's qualifications" 1 Sh ~r+ ea ^ 1112 inhabita *t, no matter how
upon Arabic—speaking British rnf Xt WaS ° ften neoessar y to fall back
for more responsiblf dutief a^d WSre nearly re9Ui
ere rather wasted as interpreters.