"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [ظ‎‎٣‎٠] (٢٩٤/٦٥)

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In addition the use of "Batmen-drivers" was found to be quite
impracticable. It was inevitable that either tn oixi ox the car
was neglected, and not unnaturally it was more often the latter, so that
no real economy was likely to be effected. As with Corps d.Q. additional
personnel were required to continue peace accounting on active service.
In Palestine moves of headquarters were less frequent than in
normal warfare. Force H.Q. had one complete move, and also on one
occasion established an operational hea.dqua.rters for three days;
Divisional H.Q's. did not move, and there were few moves of Brigade
H.Q's. In the larger headquarters a move involved serious dislocation
of the signals system, since wireless and telephone installations were
mostly of a permanent or semi-permanent nature and the move had to be
made without interruption of communications. It was usually necessary
to site a headquarters near a main civil telephone and telegraph route.
A final lesson in the staff work of all branches was the necessity
of constantly looking ahead in the matter of re-inforcements. They
usually arrived with very short notice under conditions which required
the strictest secrecy. The staff had to keep constantly before it the
questions: "What re-inforcements will be required next?" "How v/ill
they be employed, commanded, accommodated and supplied?"