"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [ظ‎‎٢‎٨] (٢٩٤/٦١)

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Subdivision within an area was largely a matter of personal opinion,
influenced sometimes hy the particular geography. In Palestine
division into sub-areas was usually the rule, m the ooa.h the exception.
But whatever system was employed a wide measure of decentralisation was
found to he necessary. The actions were those of small units often
under the command of comparatively junior regimental officers^ and
commanders had to guard against a tendency not to interfere mi oh the man
on the spot. The absence of any widespread operations together with I
ease of communication by wireless and car, made this more difficult
than it sounds, and it was only too easy for a Brigadier to get himself _
involved in a company action which might perhaps be the only one of
the day in the whole of the Brigade area. ^ Beyond this decentralisation,
other essentials of a sound organization within an area were to ensure
that the minimum number of troops was employed on piotective duties and I
the maximum number available as striking lorcesj that cleai principles
■were laid down to cover the action oi the latter} that troops were
suitably stationed to meet likely enemy moves} and khu.t sufficient trans*
port was available at each post to ensure instant mobility.
The organization of command to ensure free operation of road and
rail communications presented some difficulties, since all areas were
affected and some measure of central control was required. So far as
roads were concerned Force H.Q. controlled the operation of convoys, while
responsibility for their protection in transit and for the protection
of the road itself devolved upon the area commanders within their own
boundaries. The meeting and handing-over of convoys at area frontiers
involved a certain wastage of troops and motor transport but, after
trying out other methods with a view to effecting economics, this system
was still found in the end to give the best results* The same plan
could not be applied to the railway since protection was so intimately
connected with the technical operation. The method adopted therefore
was to constitute the railway system as a separate area under an
independent commander whose boundaries corresponded with those of rail
way property and whose headquarters were located in the railway head offi:
This system had its drawbacks, and was never entirely satisfactory to
other area commanders, but the fact remains that it worked satisfactorily
throughout. Its principal disadvantage lay in the fact that hills
overlooking the railway, from which attacks developed and snipers
operated, were outside the railway area and therefore the responsibility
of another area commander, who had sometimes to provide picquets while
the railway area troops confined their attention to close protection of
trains, stations, the track, and 'workers employed upon it. This aspect
has been dealt with in further detail in Chapter 14.
The problem of closing the frontiers to arms and undesirables was
made especially acute by the geography of Palestine. The Syrian
frontier lay in inaccessible hill country with no lateral road communica
tions, while the border with Trans-Jordan was the malarious and intensely
hot Jordan Valley lying far below sea level in which the employment
of British troops was undesirable. The task was also one for the
cavalry and mechanised infantry which the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force
was best suited to provide. For this reason the Jordan Valley was at
first made a separate area under the command of the senior T.J.F.F.
officer in Palestine. This was found to be unsatisfactory for the
reason that mobile troops ■'were often tied to static defence by the
necessity of maintaining order in the towns and protecting the Jewish
colonies which lay inside the area. Later the abolition of the Jordan
Area resulted in the O.C., T.J.F.F. units in Palestine having to deal
with two separate military area commanders, and at times even to the
distrioution of a single half-squadron between two areas. It was also
found tnat o^iicers Oj. re—inforcing British units did not always under
stand the administration and capabilities of a purely local force.
is p_ coable tnat the services, of local forees 'will usually be employ®^
to the best advantage when they are given an independent role under thei r
own commander, directly responsible to Force H.Q. and without any area
commitments*