"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [ظ‎‎٢‎٣] (٢٩٤/٥١)

44816-1
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The Jewish A t titude
The Jews n£il 3 iir 8 . 1 ILy sided, with the Goverrnifent a.s a.ga.inst the Ara.bs }
but throughout kept up a volley of vehement criticism of its moderation,
Though restraining to a remarkable degree the youtntul hotheads and
avoiding reprisals by strict self-discipline^ they fre toed intensely
over their own inactivity and bitterly assailed txie G-oveinment for not
using Jews to displace unreliable officials and to iill the gaps in the
defence forces. "Defend us or allow us to defbnd ourselves" is a
natural cry and it is not surprising that the Jew shouted it from the
house-tops. The political objections to such a coarse have already bee:
explained, but there were also very practical difficulties. The Civil
Service and the armed forces of the country had been built up upon Arabs,
and there were not sufficient trained Jews to replace them. In the end,
force of circumstances compelled the Government to organize the Jews in
the defence of lav/ and order, and in particular a large force of Super
numerary Police was raised. But by then it was too late to provide in
full the organization and training necessary with a result that their
real value was never properly exploded. There is little doubt that in
the end the authorities benefited by the subterranean defence organiza
tions which their policy had forced underground, and it might perhaps
have been better to have legalised and controlled at an earlier period
the very natural activities which developed below the surface.
THE CHOICE OF POLICY
These then were the conditions under which the Government of
Palestine were called upon to formulate a policy for the suppression
of the rebellion. With two-thirds of the population in open revolt,
with the other third clamouring for sterner retaliation, tied by the
strict provisions of the Mandate and accountable for every action to
the League of Nations, the Administration were forced to deal with the
situation in the full glare of world publicity and all the time with
serious dissention in its own ranks.
In general there were three main courses open to it. The first
was to make some temporary concession to the Arabs which would enable
the leaders to call off the campaign of violence and conduct
negotiations in a more tranquil atmosphere. But, however disguised,
this would of course have been in effect a submission to force and
wa s obviously inacceptable on that account. It was rejected by His
Majesty 1 s Government, with whom the decision lay. The second course
was conciliation, the policy, in the words of the Palestine Government,
" of endeavour i ng to protect life and pr o perty wit hout ado pting
repressive measure s" • This was the course selected by the High
Commissioner and the one adopted for five out of the six months of
the rebellion. The third was the policy recommended throughout by the
Military Commander (The Air Officer Commanding), and finally adopted
by His Majesty* s Government on 7th September, though never put filly
into effect owing to the early collapse of resistance after"that date.
was described as "intensive measures designed to crush resistance"
- m other words repression. '
Since similar courses will usually present themselves on other
occasions, it will be worth while considering the last two in detail:
the first need hardly be taken into account.