"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٢٩٤/٥٠)

leaders had been freely stated and there is little doubt that every
Arab in Palestine would have liked to see them realised, though it is
probable that the majority disliked the methods chosen to attain them.
But every Arab was either secretly or openly in varying degrees of
sympathy with the rebels and it will be remembered that the majority
of Government officials were Arabs. Though outnumbering the Jews in
the country by rather less than three to one, they vastly outnumbered
them in the civil service and dominated the railways, the police and
the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force.
Initial doubts as to their loyalty were soon confirmed when in June
a memorandum was submitted to the High Commissioner by 137 senior Arab
officials and judges. In it they claimed to be " in closer contact with
the inti mate thou ghts of the Arab popul ation" (whicn was then in full
revolt f) "than even Your Excellency* s cl oses t advisers ", and stated "we.
m ust c on scientiously raise a protest ag a inst the present policy of
repress ion 11 . This was signed or afterwards endorsed by all the senior
Arab officials with the exception of those in the Police, and was
followed by a similar memorandum from 1200 Arabs in the Second Division
of the Public Service, Nevertheless the majority continued to draw
their pay and to carry out their duties so long as these did not
contribute to the suppression of the rebellion. So far as the latter
was concerned their loyalty to the Arab cause took precedence of loyalty
to the Government which employed them, with the principal result that
any form of secrecy in government circles became practically impossible.
The nosition of the Police, which included nearly 2000 armed and
trained Arabs, had a very direct bearing on the military situation.
Though no Arab Police Officer signed the manifesto there had been
apprehension of a strike in the lower ranks earlier in the rebellion.
Their families were subjected to intimidation; they found it difficult
to obtain food; and their position was intolerable. On steps being
taken to meet these difficulties there was no further open trouble, but
the value of the Arab policeman remained a doubtful quantity for the
rest of the period. There were certainly many instances of good
service under great difficulty, but in Police circles again leakage of
information was noticeable and it was perhaps inevitable that the
soldier never felt he could rely upon real support from the Arab section
of the Police. The Trans-Jordan Frontier Force with 700 Arab soldiers
remained loyal and active throughout, regarding itself primarily as the
Regular Army of Trans-Jordan and therefore above participation in the
political bickerings of Palestine, although many of its recruits were^
drawn from Palestine and three-fifths of the Force were employed within
its borders.
In semi-official and unofficial circles nearly every Arab gave the
rebellion practics.1 support in some form or other. At the head oi the
Higher Committee was the Mufti of Jerusalem, undouotedly the most
influential Arab in Palestine, who drew a salary from the Government
as President of the Supreme Moslem Council and who by virtue of this
office had control of religious funds amounting to over £ 100,000 a year.
Appointed by and answerable to the Mufti were the Qadis oi the Moslem
S hari * a Courts who too submitted their memorandum. This was more
mutinous in tone than the others. It described the Governments policy
as "detestable"; it charged the police and military with " unimagi nable
acts": ~and it warned "the British authorities of the revenge of God
tiio Almighty". It demanded, in conclusion, " the grant of all the de mands
of ~t lie "jirabs and the enforcement o f the pledges given to them . 11
With such an atmosphere prevalent in both official and semi-official
circles, it is remarkable that the rebellion was not more wholehearted
than it was; but nevertheless it was this lead that inspired the young
men of a simple peasantry, urged on by bellicose elders and women and
with the professional agitator ever in the background, to recover hidden
arms and taJce the field.