"تقارير إدارة أقسام ومناطق الأراضي المحتلة في بلاد الرافدين لسنة ١٩١٨. المجلد I" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٨] (٤٧٠/٤٦١)

to the tribes ranged on the Turkish side, and at the end of 1917 it was decided that
the establishment of a blockade at Kuwait was essential. On January 4th, 1918,
Shaikh Salim, the Kuler of Kuwait, agreed to our establishing a blockade for the
control of exports to the interior ; hut a few days later withdrew his consent on the
grounds that his honour and dignity would be affected, and even a visit on February
9th from the Deputy Political Resident, Bushire, hearing a message from the Civil
Commissioner, failed to change the attitude of uncompromising opposition to the
blockade which he had assumed.
On February 10th the s.s. “ Zayani ” was ordered by the Political Agent, Colonel
R. E. A. Hamilton, not to unload her cargo, which was subsequently overcarried
to Basrah. An immediate improvement in the situation took place, and on
February 16th Shaikh Salim accepted the blockade proposals without reservation.
On February 22nd a British blockade officer, Lieut. D. V. McCollum, and four
British other ranks, landed at Kuwait to control the blockade arrangements.
Though this officer nominally received every assistance, considerable obstacles
were placed in his way, and there was reason to believe that goods continued to leave
Kuwait, which was full of piece stuffs and piece goods ; but, as the posts were manned
by the Shaikh’s retainers, no proof was forthcoming, though it was evident that while
the personnel were Kuwaitis leakage was hound to continue.
At the beginning of April several large caravans, aggregating 4,900 camels,
purporting to be from Qasim and other eastern parts of Bin Sa £ ud’s territory, but in
reality composed largely of enemy elements, or traders with the enemy, and con
siderable numbers of Beduin with some 3,000 camels, had congregated at Kuwait,
and asked foi* blockade permits to export very abnormal quantities of supplies of all
sorts. After reference to Baghdad it was decided to refuse these requests, with the
exception of a few which were properly vouched for. On April 10th, H.M. ships
“ Lawrence ” (Commander L. H. Crozier) and “ Bramble ” arrived at Kuwait, and the
next morning the headmen of the caravans and tribes were summoned to the Shaikh s
palace to receive the answer regarding the permits. The Political Agent and the
blockade officer interviewed the Shaikh, informing him of the very abnormal
quantities and kinds of goods exported in the preceding 15 months, and of the still
more abnormal quantities asked for by the caravans and tribes then in Kuwait.
After some demur the Shaikh agreed to turn them away empty, hut when the
headmen were called in his resolution failed, and the orders had eventually to be
issued by the Political Agent, A letter was sent to Bin Sa‘ud explaining the matter
and asking him to come to some arrangement for the future regulation of traffic with
Mr. Philby (an officer of the I.C.S. deputed to Bin Sa‘ud from the staff of the Civil
Commissioner), and each caravan leader was given a letter to the Amir (Goveruor) of
his district explaining why he was bringing no goods. During the succeeding three
days the tribes and caravans left, always passing in view of the Agency so that it
could be seen that no goods were taken out. As a precaution, in view of the large
numbers involved, a machine gun was placed on the Agency roof, and subsequently a
second was mounted. On the last days news was received that the one remaining
caravan was smuggling out arms and ammunition concealed in their saddles, and a
guard of marines and bluejackets was landed, and some of the camels searched, hut
without success. The turning away passed off quietly, and after waiting a short time
to see if there was any chance of getting goods out by driblets the caravans betook
themselves to Bin SaTid, complaining bitterly. Considerable resentment was aroused
in Najd at the time, hut died down owing to the sensible attitude taken up by Bin
Sa 4 ud, who now has a properly accredited representative at Kuwait to vouch for his
caravans. At the same time, in order to avoid the occupation of Kuwait, it was
decided to try to settle the Kuwait problem by buying up all the stocks held in Kuwait
and to limit imports in order to prevent their being replaced.
The effect of the action taken on April 11th was that on May 4th the Shaikh
wrote a letter to the Political Agent begging that Government would extend to him
the same friendship and protection as his predecessors had received and pledging
himself to complete responsibility for any thing which might take place in his territory,
while a marked improvement took place in the general attitude of the Shaikh’s
officials. The Shaikh’s overtures were submitted to Government, but owing to some
delay in their acceptance the Shaikh grew restive and the Political Agent was
authorised on June 3rd to inform him that Government were giving his letter their
friendly consideration and that it was hoped that Sir Percy Cox would deliver their
reply on his return to Mesopotamia.