"تقارير إدارة أقسام ومناطق الأراضي المحتلة في بلاد الرافدين لسنة ١٩١٨. المجلد I" [و‎‎٩‎٤] (٤٧٠/١٩٢)

When, however, we came to apply the rates sanctioned to the areas reported by the D.I.O., it was
found in so many cases that the results were utterly at variance with the mamurs’ estimations,
previously made, and with known facts that I decided to “ scrap ” measurements entirely, except where
they agreed closely with the mamur figures. The errors were so extensive as to show that the fault
lay with the measurers and not with rates or classification.
The land of different sarkals was inextricably muddled up,and unknown names appeared, while
well-known sarkals did not appear on the list at all.
The mamurs’ figures naturally depended for their character on the idiosyncrasies of mamurs. The
most important shu‘bah, the Musaiyib, was estimated by my Mudir Mai, a man of great experience
and ability; the Mahmudiyah shu‘bah was well done by the professional estimators; the other two
shu‘bahs were erratic. I accordingly went over doubtful cases in the Musaiyib (i.e., cases in which the
mamur's estimate disagreed wildly from measurements). The Mudir Mai accompanied me and did
the estimating, on the corn piled in stacks. Not being an estimator myself, all I could do was to make
sure that the estimation was done with a single eye, i.e., that all cases were treated alike.
We traversed the whole of the Iskandariyah and Jurf Sakhr shu‘bahs. A cursory inspection of
the Mahmudiyah convinced us that the assessors had assessed very fairly and we only inspected
carefully those cases in which it appeared that revenue could be paid. My previous knowledge and
assessors’ reports convinced me that we should have to remit over most the muqata‘ah. And in fact
most of the stacks were unhappy looking heaps of wild oats.
My general impression is that the district was assessed on the safe side, i.e., underassessed, but
not by a great deal, and there were some undeniable cases of hardship.
3. Assessments—Lift Lands.—My standard was that one-tenth of the produce of a baqrah may
fairly be represented for revenue purposes as four waznahs of barley and three waznahs of wheat, and
on this standard I based my karad assessments.
But it is obvious that a standard like this must not be applied individually but collectively, and
it worked best in the case of the Janabiyin karads in the Jurf Sakhr shu‘bah, which consist in some
300 baqrahs. In this case I simply told the shaikh that I wanted from his karad people 120 tons barley
and 90 tons of wheat, that four waxnahs barley and three waxnahs of wheat per baqrah was to be taken
as the standard of assessment, but that he had leave to make alterations (increases or reductions) in
20 per cent, of cases, provided the total remained the same. He embodied his division of the burden
in a “ daftar,” and I had only one appeal against the assessment, which turned out to be due to a
clerical error.
4. Collections .—For this subject please see the report sent under cover of my 1318 of 26th August,
1918.
I have no further comments. Everything has on the whole gone well, except as regards collections
from Faisal.
Mv personal opinion is that arrangements made were, on the whole, sound, but then they were
very much on the safe side, a considerable distance, I think, beyond a reasonable margin of safety.
As my district stands as a unit I am not prepared to say that I could have got on equally well
without a Harvest Officer. If we are to collect with the safeguard of British ranks, I think a Harvest
Officer is essential. But, as I have said above, I think we made assurances somewhere about trebly
sure this year.
We could get the grain in, weighed and sacked just as well without Resources as with them. The
solidarity advantage of having their representative present up to this point is the avoidance of
subsequent petty squabbles over weights and possible pilferings when the grain changes hands. We
could get the grain to the railway without help. Subsequently to that the matter is one of negotiations
with the Army about sacks, trucks, &c., which I think would be a severe strain on our time.
We should doubtless also be cheated more than we were this year if we dispense with British ranks,
and the process of collection and delivery would be much lower as an A.P.O. could not possibly get
round his ‘anbars as a Harvest Officer does.
If the Army is going to be in the same hurry for grain this year, some form of British bash-
mamur-anbar will be esential to speed things up. We should also need British ranks to look after
machinery.
APPENDIX C.
Copy of A.P.O. Musaiyib’s 605 of 15th April 1918 to F.R.O., Baghdad.
I have considered the question of assessing the Musaiyib vegetable tax on the ground. I think
that, considering the uncertainty of prices, we must be prepared to forgo something. My impression
is that with iltizam collection we should get about Rs. 40,000, and with efficient collection by
Government, about Rs. 50,000. As it is impossible to ensure the latter, I think we should do better
to tax on the ground. It appears that this custom was not unknown in Turkish times, as the Sanniyah
near Samarra used to take 4 as. on each jowah. The jowah is the bank in which vegetables are grown
(usually about 12 feet by 2 feet), and I think in default of measurements it is the best unit of taxation.
I would propose here a tax of Re. 1 per jowah all round, as I find nearly all cultivators grow cheap
vegetables, e.g., “ bamiyah,” and paying kinds, e.g., cucumbers as well. Jowahs are not all the same
size, but, again, most people have both large and small jowahs.
I would suggest that you permit remissions if a jowah fails, and also, if the price of vegetables goes
unexpectedly low, we could reduce the tax slightly.
2. There are at present about 30,000 jowahs laid down in the Musaiyib shu‘bah.
3. I would propose to announce a provisional tax of Re. 1/- per jowah, with a condition that it will'
be reduced if prices fall or crops fail.