"تقارير إدارة أقسام ومناطق الأراضي المحتلة في بلاد الرافدين لسنة ١٩١٨. المجلد I" [و‎‎٣‎٨] (٤٧٠/٨٠)

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It is not, therefore, surprising to find that at the outbreak of war the Shamiyah
Shaikhs were in communication with the Sharif of Mecca for the formation of an
independent Arab Kingdom.
Again, an interesting and relevant point is that the great majority of the
Shamiyah Shaikhs grow rice. In these cases the authority of the Shaikhs over
the cultivator is absolute, an extreme autocracy. The reason for this is probably
the severity of the life of the rice cultivator, and the absolute necessity for organised
labour and constant attention. The cultivator has found by* experience that lack
of organisation produces a bad crop, and that his only hope lies in implicit obedience
to the tribal chief. Also this paramount authority is found among the Arab of
the desert. This is a marked contradistinction to the shitwi-growing Shaikh, whose
tribesmen are far freer and can and do exercise greater independence of action and
opinion.
The beginning of war, therefore, found Shamiyah a large fertile tract, thickly
populated with armed bands of robbers, owning implicit obedience to wealthy,
ignorant, and swollen-headed chiefs, inspiring terror in the hearts of all, including
the Turkish Government.
In April 1915 the Turkish Government was driven out of Najaf, and Shamiyah
at once followed Najaf’s example. From this date till the beginning of 1918, the
interregnum between the removal of Turkish control and the organisation of our
Government, enabled the tribal Shaikhs to assert their authority to a degree which
formerly had been impossible, but which was the inevitable outcome of the
Turkish policy. It further gave them a taste of complete independence and entire
freedom from necessity of paying any revenue, which pleasurable sensation they
will not easily forget.
The Najafis .—The Najafi is as much a creature of his environment as is the
Shamiyah tribesman. Half Persian, living in an atmosphere of bigotry, often
wealthy, yet professing poverty, looking on pilgrims and Bedus coming in to trade
alike as his lawful prey, isolated, but the receiver and distorter of all the news of
the world, which he inevitably hears through the stream of the faithful pouring
into the Holy City, he exercises a malign influence far beyond the limits of his
town or even of ‘Iraq. His isolation, and the prestige he exercises over those who
perforce visit him in his lair, tend to make him independent and impatient of reform
or control. This applies with greater force to the Arab population of Najaf. The
Persians, as aliens, are naturally less independent and fear the Arab. But they,
again, can be obstructive : any attempt to touch their pockets in the way of taxation
was met by a protest from the Persian Government, resulting in exemption.
As the holiest city of the Shi‘ahs and the seat of the great Mujtahids it has
naturally been a predominant influence in all Shi‘ah and especially Persian affairs.
The large Shar‘ah cases, involving many interests in Persia, are decided in Najaf.
A Shah of Persia, to carry out any important measure, was compelled to obtain
the advice and support of the Mujtahids, and did he ever act without their consent
they were not slow to make their influence felt. The Shahs of Persia invariably
took care to placate the leading Mujtahids of Najaf, well knowing that they might,
in extreme cases, have to rely on their support to retain their throne It is said
that it is fully within the power of a great Mujtahid to excommunicate the Shah.
It was not, however, until there presented itself the magnificent opportunity
afforded by the unfortunate wave of intelligent democracy that spread over the
East some 10 years ago and resulted, first, in the Persian and, later, in the Turkish
Constitutions, that Najaf rose to its full height as a storm-centre of political intrigue.
The Constitutionalists were well aware that they stood little chance of success
were they unable to obtain the influence of some leading Mujtahids on their side.
Every means in their power was exerted to obtain the desired result, and finally
they triumphed, owing to the definite commitment of Akhund Khurasani to their
party. Since that date Najaf has been but a reflection of the varying political
parties at work in Persia, the continual efforts of the “ outs ” to obtain the influence
of some great Mujtahid which will prejudice the “ ins.” Though the great
Mujtahids hold aloof, the continual intrigue of the smaller fry is often successful.
An ignorant and superstitious populace goes with them, and the great Mujtahid,
whose power is based on popularity, is compelled to acquiesce and to put his name
to a pronouncement which may have serious effects.
Such is now the religious side of Najaf, Mujtahids, ‘Alims, and students all
profoundly ignorant, played upon by self-seeking politicians in Tehran or Baghdad