"تقرير عسكري عن العراق. المنطقة ٢ (أعلى الفرات)" [ظ‎‎٢‎٤] (١٤٠/٥٣)

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maintain more than one quarter of that number in the field.
They would most probably direct their attentions to harassing
communication between Baghdad and Fallujah, as they did
during the 1920 insurrection.
Political Attitude .—The political attitude of the Upper
Euphrates must be considered from three standpoints, i.e. :—-
(a) External as regards Syria.
{b) External as regards Turkey.
(c) Internal.
{a) The admitted ambition of the Damascus Government
is to establish the frontier between Syria and Iraq on the Wadi
Hauran. To this ambition were due the disturbances on the
Upper Euphrates early in 1920, which began with the
unauthorised occupation of Dair-al-Zor by Ramadhanal
Shallash and terminated in the subsequent British withdrawal
to A1 Qaim after a conference with fully accredited repre
sentatives of the Syrian Government.
The primary object of the Syrian Arab Government was to
make our position in the newly occupied area so uncomfortable,
and to harass our lines of communication to such an extent,
that we would be compelled to evacuate practically the whole
of the Upper Euphrates.
With this end in view they disseminated extensive pan-Arab
propaganda amongst the tribes in our area of occupation,
which eventually bore fruit in the shape of definite hostility
towards the British on the part of Aqaidat sections, the
Jaghaifah and one or two Dulaim sections in the vicinity of
Anah.
Although they failed to attain their ambition to the full
{i.e., establishment of boundary on the Wadi Hauran) the
Damascus Government succeeded in forcing withdrawal to
A1 Qaim, and there is little doubt that to-day the desire to
extend their territory downstream still exists.
The re-occupation of Damascus and establishment of control
over the Arab Government by the French, however, is likely to
have a restraining influence in this direction, although they
have shown remarkably little power to minimise the activity
of tribes adjoining our sphere of influence, which once having
become steeped in anti-British propaganda, display little desire
to resume friendly relations.
The friendship and alliance with Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal,
chief of the Amarat section of the Anizah, has proved a very
valuable weapon in our hands in dealing with trans-frontier
tribal politics. As long as we can rely upon Fahad Beg to take
action, the danger of any purely tribal aggression is reduced to
a minimum.