"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [ظ‎‎٩‎٧] (٢٢٦/١٩٩)

against Syria and Nationalist Turkey may be briefly
considered from a defensive and offensive point of view:
Syria. —(a) Defensive .—The possibility of a large mixed
force operating with Dair al Zor as a base against Mosul
is remote. The water supply on the only route possible
for wheels precludes the existence of more than a striking
force of two cavalry regiments. It might be possible to
move echelons of cavalry regiments from water supply to
water supply, but the first place where such echelons could
form a striking force of more than two regiments would
be in the area of Balad Sinjar-Ain Ghazal, some 120
miles from Dair al Zor. Balad Sinjar lies 75 miles west
of Mosul and is accessible by a route passable for wheels
and with water supplies sufficient for one division at all
stages. The Jabal Sinjar commands the route from Dair
al Zor and offers a position from which to develop, with
security to the attacking force, flank attacks on any force
moving along the road. The continuation of the Jabal
Sinjar to Eski Mosul confers further powers of flank
attacks on the defenders. The Jabal Sinjar-Ain Ghazal
area is then obviously the outstanding strategic feature in
operations with Syria, and gives the defence supreme
advantages over an offending force from that country.
As Balad Sinjar is the centre of a large supply area
capable of maintaining a brigade indefinitely and a
division for at least two months, it gives the defensive
force another great advantage. The occupation of Balad
Sinjar by a brigade would probably defeat any attempt
at attack on Mosul from the west. Assuming the occupa
tion of Sinjar by a Syrian force, there still remain
defensive positions across the Jabal Eski Mosul-Jabal
Atshan-Jabal Mahalabiyah, which would entail an
offensive force of at least two divisions and a. defensive
force of one division.
(b) Offensive .—An offensive from Balad Sinjar towards
Dair al Zor is only possible by a small mounted force. It
might be possible to concentrate a cavalry brigade on the
Khabur, but the line of communications after Balad
Sinjar would be liable to attack from Badawin. Such
a force might occupy Dair al Zor if it were lightly held,
but a supporting offensive from the region of Albu Kemal
would be necessary to open up a line of supply from
Baghdad.
Turkey. —(a) Defensive .—There are, if we omit the
movement of troops via the left bank of the Tigris, two
possible roads for troops from Nisibin-Mardin area, viz.,