"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [ظ‎‎٧‎٩] (٢٢٦/١٦٣)

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and mules. Of the rifles, about 50 are British 1914
pattern, for which he has 100 rounds per rifle, and the
remainder are Mausers, for which he has roughly about
50 rounds per rifle. In the event of a Turkish advance
Ha mm n would require Mauser ammunition from the
Iraq Government before he could make any move on
Turkish lines of communication and convoys.
As already stated and described, the leading
personality in the tribe is Hammu Shiru. , It is advis
able to add that, so far as the temporal policy of the
Sinjar Yezidis is concerned, the spiritual head of the
Yezidis, who lives in Baidri, north of Mosul, has no
influence at all. Hammu Shiru, who is the Government
Chief of the Sinjar, is to all intents and purposes an
autocratic king. Another prominent personality is Daud
al Daud, who is Chief of Mihrkhan, where he resides.
He was formerly a bitter enemy of Hammu Shiru, but
latterly is reported to have become reconciled to him.
He is much respected by Moslem tribes and Tel Afar is.
Another man of note is Husain, the Wakil of Hammu
Shiru. He appears to be intelligent and in favour of
accentuating rather than moderating the despotism of
his master. Husain ibn Burgess ibn Sufuk is the prin
cipal lay agha of Jabal Sinjar, and bitterly opposed to
the present Chief of the Yezidis. He was Chief of the
Musarah tribe until deposed by Hammu Shiru in favour
of Sufuk ibn Saidu, though people still recognize Husain
as Chief. In spite of his bitterness to Hammu Shiru,
he is loyal to Government. Another personality, who
is not a Yezidi but exercises considerable influence
among them, is Najim ibn Abdullah Suhaq, who was
appointed Mayor of Balad Sinjar by the British. He
is a Christian merchant, who was very loyal to the
British and punished by the Turks as a spy. He is rich,
possesses considerable influence over Hammu Shiru, but
does not always give disinterested advice.
Punitive measures against the Yezidis are never likely
to be necessary, but, if they w^ere, would require the use
of large forces skilled in mountain warfare. The pre
liminary step from the Iraq side would be the occupation
of Balad Sinjar, which lies about 75 miles west of Mosul
and is accessible to L.A.M. cars and Ford vans from
that city. From Balad Sinjar it would be easy to
destroy the Yezidi villages in the southern foothills, and
cut them off from the large wheat-growing area in the
Sinjar plain. The effective occupation of the Jabal
would, however, require at least two brigades of infantry