"ملاحظات ميدانية: بلاد الرافدين. هيئة الأركان العامة في الهند. فبراير ١٩١٧". [ظ‎‎٧] (٣٥٠/٢١)

A more peremptory summons was, however, issued later in the
year, which resulted in the Shaikh stating that he would have no
option but to comply unless he'was assured of British support.
He was informed that the British Government would not tolerate
any attack upon him by land or sea, and the Senior Naval
Officer again received instructions to defend Kuwait, by force if
necessary. To complicate matters further Ibn Rashid (prob
ably instigated by the Turkish officials at Basrah), advanced
towards Kuwait town, whereupon a provisional scheme of land
defences was drawn up by the Senior Naval Officer, in con
junction with the Shaikh, and some machine-guns and blue
jackets were landed. The threatened attack, however, passed
off, and the Porte again disavowed the action of its officials,
only, however, during the next year, 1903, to occupy various
more or less debatable points on the Kuwait boundaries with
small posts of troops, i.e., Safwan, Bubiyan Island, Umm Qasr,
and Warbah Island.
The Turkish Government still exercises a certain pressure
upon the Shaikh, presumably owing to his possessing private
property at Fao and Basrah, but between the years 1903 and 1910
there was little to record in the way of interference with the
rather vague “status quo” which has been already alluded to.
The conception of this status quo, and the manner in which the
question is now regarded by His Majesty’s Government, was
stated by Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons on March 9th,
1911, in a debate concerning the new arrangements in contempla
tion for the construction of the Baghdad-Persian Gulf section
of the Baghdad Railway. His words were: “We are not
anxious to disturb the status quo in the Persian Gulf. To a great
extent that status quo has been built up by us in previous genera
tions. We have practically opened the Persian Gulf to trade and
kept it open. That has been a matter of historical knowledge for
years past. We are not anxious to have a forward policy in the
Persian Gulf, to acquire new territory, or to disturb the status-
quo; but if the status quo is going to be disturbed by others, then
we must undoubtedly use our resources to maintain the position
we have in the Persian Gulf. Part of the status quo is that we
have entered into treaty obligations with the Shaikh of Kuwait
and in any negotiations which there may be, or in any changes,
which may take place, it is an obligationpf honour with us to see
that our treaty obligations towards the Shaikh of Kuwait in
maintaining his position are fulfilled.”