مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [و‎‎٣‎٩‎٤] (٨٠٢/٧٨٨)

Jordan tribes since the 1st August. They added that Captain Glubb
would be authorised to arrange for the restitution of any loot identified
as having been taken from Hejazi or Nejdi tribes.
(5) Finally, His Majesty’s Government, having regard to the urgent necessity
for restoring the camels looted from Transjordan, offered British
^ co-operation in the Wadi Sirhan, if the Hejazi Government should
find themselves confronted with any practical difficulty in returning
them immediately.
19. The sequel to this firm all-but-ultimatum will be related in the next
report. To complete the present section it is only necessary to add that during
the period under review it was decided under Captain Glubb’s advice to introduce
various modifications into the scheme adopted last autumn for the improvement
of the frontier control on the Transjordan side.
Druse Refugees in Nejd.
20. The question of the disposal of Sultan A1 Atrash and his followers, who
have for some time been in Nejd close to the Transjordan frontier, again engaged
attention early in the year. There were last year two alternative proposals,
viz., that Ibn Saud should be asked to move them further into the interior or that
arrangements should be made for the party to be allowed to settle in Iraq. No
decision had apparently been taken up to the end of February. The presence of
the refugees so close to it is a thorn in the side of Transjordan. According to one
account, which cannot be vouched for, the French are for their part displeased
with Ibn Saud for affording hospitality to the party.
Iraq.
“ Bon-Yoisinaqe," &c.
21. Following on the transactions related in section 6 {a) of the December
report and after further consultations between Bagdad and London, King Feisal
telegraphed to Ibn Saud on the 7th February proposing that his Prime Minister
should take advantage of a recess of the Iraq Parliament to visit Jedda
immediately after Ramadan in order to sign the “ Bon-Voisinage ” Treaty, and
discuss all outstanding questions including extradition. A Bagdad telegram to
the Colonial Office of the 8th February showed that Nuri Pasha also proposed
to deal with claims, trade facilities and pilgrim traffic, besides showing and
explaining to Ihn Saud the new Iraq-Transjordan Treaty (which he was to sign
at Amman en route) and discussing the case of Ibn Mashhur. Ibn Saud replied
at once in terms of cordial acquiescence. Things looked all the rosier because
it was known that the Iraq Government were not so uncompromising about
extradition as might have been supposed from their letter of the middle of
December and because Ibn Sand on his side accepted in a letter written bv his
Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 29th January King Feisal’s explanation
regarding his £30,000 award, adding only that the money would be paid when a
settlement of other outstanding questions had been reached. A more conciliatory
letter on the former point was addressed by the Iraq Government to the Hejazi
Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 1st February.
22. Alas for the roses that bloomed in Bagdad! When Ibn Saud was at
the height of his pleasurable anticipation and full of preparations for the
reception of Nuri Pasha, the latter sent a message on the 18th February through
Sir F. Humphrys and Sir A. Ryan expressing regret that, owing to delay over
pending oil negotiations, he was compelled to postpone his visit. His delay
aroused suspicions in the Hejazi mind, which the Legation in Jedda sought to
allay. Things would not have been so bad, had the delay been short or had not
the Bagdad press announced that Nuri Pasha was to visit Jedda on Ibn Saud’s
invitation to discuss the Arab Alliance. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin came to see Sir A.
Ryan on the 26th February, waving a Bagdad newspaper in which this
tendentious statement was attributed to Nuri Pasha himself. In the course of
a long conversation on the whole position Sir A. Ryan administered all the
soothing syrup he could,but the outlookwas not a happyoneat theendof February.