مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [و‎‎٣‎٦‎٤] (٨٠٢/٧٢٨)

7
Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeyd should meet to examine and settle past raids.
Captain Glubb’s opinion at the end of the meeting, however, was to the effect
that, if His Majesty’s Government proposed to stand aside and urge Ibn Saud
and Transjordan to arrange matters between them, there was not the least chance
of Ibn Saud returning a single animal. Captain Glubb also feared that if the
jnatter of claims were pressed home at their next meeting, the only outcome would
ibe an open rupture between himself and Ibn Zeyd. There were no more meetings.
Preventive Measures against Raiding.
26. In a letter dated the 5th July Fuad Bey Hamza drew Sir A. Ryan s
attention to the supposed fact that the measures taken to prevent raiding were
only designed to'last over the period of the Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meeting for the settle
ment of claims. He therefore asked for His Majesty’s Government’s views'as to
how to prevent raids after the meeting. While submitting the request to His
Majesty's Government, Sir A. Ryan gave his personal views in conversation with
Fuad Bey on the 7th July. He reminded him that it had been agreed after a
definite exchange of views that the proclamations of Ibn Saud and the Amir
Abdullah should apply to all raiding at all times and not merely during the
Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meeting. He recognised of course that proclamations alone
would not stop raiding. That must be effected by the measures taken on both
sides of the frontier and their co-ordination by co-operation between local
authorities, as contemplated in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. As regards
measures, the position was that last October His Majesty's Government had fully
informed the Hejazi Government of what was being done on the
Transjordan side. They had, however, received no similar statement
from the Hejazi Government. The best means of preventing future trouble
were (1) mutual knowledge of the measures taken on each side, and (2) collabora
tion in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. These views were endorsed by
His Majesty’s Government and confirmed to Fuad Bey by His Majesty’s Charge
d’Affaires on the 10th August. There was no reaction in the direction of either
(1) or (2) above.
Raiding Criminals.
27. In conversation on the 7th July Fuad Bey Hamza enquired of Sir A.
Ryan as to the position regarding raiding criminals. He was told that the
further points raised by the Hejazi Government had presented great difficulty
and were still being examined. Now^ at the end of June the High Commissioner
for Transjordan had expressed the view 7 that the raiding-criminals formula (see
May-June report, paragraph 28) should be dropped and a formal extradition
agreement negotiated in its stead. He had therefore proposed that the Trans
jordan delegation to Jedda be fully empowered to negotiate a suitable formula
only if Hejazi opposition to a formal extradition agreement could not be overcome.
The delegation would consist of Mr. Kirkbride only, as the Amir Abdullah was
not disposed to send a Transjordan official. If an extradition agreement proved
feasible, how r ever, it would presumably be negotiated by His Majesty's Minister,
co-operating with Mr. Kirkbride, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, since
the Amir Abdullah would almost certainly object to direct negotiations between
Transjordan and Ibn Saud. On the 8th August His Majesty’s Government
expressed their general concurrence, provided the Hejazi Government were
willing, but suggested that the agreement should be similar in form to the Bahra
Agreement of 1925, i.e., signed by the Hejazi Government and a British pleni
potentiary on behalf of the Transjordan Government. In that case Sir A. Ryan
should negotiate and sign as plenipotentiary, Mr. Kirkbride acting merely as his
expert adviser. The High* Commissioner for Transjordan replied on the
21st August that the Amir Abdullah would not agree, but that he insisted on
requesting that the agreement should be made by His Majesty's Government as
mandatory and subsequently applied to Transjordan by local legislation. There
the matter has rested.
Mutual Recovery of Loot.
28. The Hejazi Government’s statement that, although many Transjordan
raiders were entering the Hejaz-Nejd with the loot they had previously taken
from Hejaz-Nejd tribesmen, the Government were prepared to forgo its recovery