مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [و‎‎٣‎٤‎٢] (٨٠٢/٦٨٤)

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Railway. The committee's report was neither accurate nor profound. The
discussion of it was too inflamed to be serious. The following resolution was
finally adopted :—
“ After hearing the report of the committee on the Hejaz Railway and
^ perusing the documents relating thereto, the congress declares its resentment
of the usurpation of Moslem property, which is essentially a Wakf. The
congress should approach Islamic and other Governments in this regard, and
should empower the Executive Committee to discuss other means for the
recovery of this line.'’
26. Ft remains to be seen what action, if any, Ibn Saud will take.
Moslem Congress at Jerusalem.
27. On the 14th November the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, under
urgent instructions from Ibn Saud, requested His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires
to ascertain His Majesty's Government's attitude towards the proposed Moslem
Congress. The Grand Mufti of Palestine, Fuad Bey said, had invited the Hejazi
Government to send a representative and leading persons, like himself and
Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, to attend. He sti’essed the probable anti-British and
patently anti-Saudi complexion of the conference, and said that the King did not
know whether to stand aloof and suffer the consequences, or to send a representa
tive to look after his interests. He did not like the agenda and was confused by
the fact of receiving an invitation from a Palestinian Government official. So
he relied on a lead from His Majesty's Government.
28. Fuad Bey was told on the 21st November, in reply, that His Majesty’s
Urovernment regretted that they could not take the responsibility of advising
Ibn Saud as to whether he should send delegates or not. He might, however, be
glad to know that His Majesty's Government were in no way associated with the
proposal to hold the congress, and that it had neither their encouragement nor
support. Their attitude was one of detachment, excepting in so far as regarded
any possible reaction on public security in Palestine. As for the Grand Mufti,
he was no doubt acting as a religious dignitary and not as a Palestinian official.
29. A week later Fuad Bey was orally informed that, as a result of recent
<X)nversations between the High Commissioner for Palestine and the Grand
Mufti. His Majesty's Government did not anticipate that political issues would
be raised, or that the proceedings of the congress would cause embarrassment to
Ibn Saud’s Government. Moreover, the Grand Mufti had given a specific
assurance that the Caliphate question would not be raised. Fuad Bey expressed
gratitude for this information.
30. In the event Ibn Saud sent no delegate, his “ Umm-al-Qura ” snubbed
the congress (although Fuad Hamza sent a message of support), and the only
questions raised at Jerusalem which appear to affect Ibn Saud were that of the
Hejaz Railway, dealt with in paragraph 25 above; the proposal that a committee
be appointed in each Moslem country to raise funds for the projected universitv
at Jerusalem; and the circulation of a propaganda leaflet, entitled “ The Voice
-of Mecca,” denouncing the Saudi regime. It may also be noted that the delegates
visited the tomb of the late ex-King Hussein, and lunched with his son Abdullah.
Wahhabi tendencies were displayed at the congress by Rashid Ridha, an
Egyptian, but met with opposition from the rest.
Security.
31. The only known case affecting internal security continued to be that
of the Danish Moslem, Knud Holmboe (September-October report, paragraph 24).
Although informed that the man had definitely not returned to Transjordan, and
repeatedly pressed, unofficially, for more and accurate information^ Fuad Bey
only replied that nothing was known of the affair.