مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [ظ‎‎٣‎١‎٧] (٨٠٢/٦٣٥)

■■■ ————
8
from getting assistance from that country both by prohibition and by reinforcing
the frontier police. Steps were taken to prevent the Beni Atiya from joining the
rebellion, and guarantees were taken from the sheikhs of other tribes m Southern
Transjordan. The considered attitude of His Majesty s Government towards the
Hejazi representations was defined in a note sent by the Legation to the Acting
Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 11th June. His Majesty s Govern- ^
ment regretted that Ibn Rifada and his party had succeeded in slipping from
Sinai into the Hejaz in a very few hours before the authorities in 1 alestme and
Transjordan were aware of the movement. They explained that it was physically
impossible to close the frontier, and that it was for the Hejazi Government, whose
forces must not, however, enter Transjordan, to bar the exit of rebels. 1 hc>
nevertheless would take all steps to assist the Hejazi authorities, and they
promised that fugitive rebels entering Transjordan would, as far as possible, be
disarmed and removed to safe places. The note described in general terms the
measures already taken in Transjordan. His Majesty’s Government refused to
guarantee the surrender of fugitive rebels, but promised that everything possible
would be done to prevent such persons from causing fresh trouble. The question
of a treaty settlement between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan was dealt with on
the lines indicated above. The first reaction of the Hejazi Government to this
note was highly critical. In a reply of the 15th June they complained that the
action of the British authorities was inadequate and stressed the question of
responsibilities. Some days later they changed their tactics. In a series of
conversations from the 21st to 23rd June the Acting Minister for Foreign Aftairs
did not revert to his note. He tacitly accepted the position that Ilis Majesty s
Government were doing all they could, and confined himself to discussing
practical questions of co-operation between the British and Hejazi Governments,
always on the underlying assumption that the Amir Abdullah was the common
enemy. It was unnecessary to continue the discussion of the wider aspects of
the affair up to the end of June.
(c) In those circumstances it became increasingly, as the month wore on, a
matter of co-ordinating the measures of the authorities in Transjordan and of
the Hejazi Government. A certain amount of information, not very plentiful on
either side, was exchanged. Arrangements were made in principle for wireless
communication between Hejazi and Transjordan posts, but it had not been
effectively established up to the 30th June. H.M.S. Penzance was sent to
Aqaba, and arrived there on the 14th June. H.M.S. Hastings also left
Port Sudan for the north of the Red Sea on the 2/th June. The despatch of
‘ ‘ Penzance ’ ’ was decided on for general reasons, but anticipated a request by
the Hejazi Government on the 18th June that measures should be taken to guard
against assistance reaching the rebels by sea, meaning, it was explained later, any
maritime movement of craft, loaded or unloaded, which might bring supplies or
facilitate any movement, whether of attack or flight.
(d) Early in June the Hejazi Government manifested extreme displeasure
against Egypt, and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of a rupture
with that country. This mood passed, partly perhaps because of the dissuasive
language of Sir A. Ryan. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian Government, while
denying, both privately and publicly, that Ibn Rifada’s expedition could have
been fitted out in Egypt, has shown every readiness, at the instance of His
Majesty’s Government, to apply and co-operate in measures to prevent assistance
from reaching the rebels from Egypt either by land or sea.
182. The foregoing summary ignores may details, but gives an adequate
account of the Ibn Rifada affair and its sequel. It is noteworthy that the Hejazi
Government, while preparing a formidable demonstration of force, have shown no
great celerity in mobilising it. They have probably banked on the fact that
Ibn Rifada has presented no appearance of having provoked any widespread
rebellion and has remained confined to the littoral area. It is possible that
Ibn Saud’s object in making preparations so formidable in relation to the
apparently small proportions of the menace is partly to overawe his own tribes
generally and to impress on the Amir Abdullah and others the futility of attempts
to upset his regime in the Hejaz. . .
183. It has been most difficult meanwhile to gauge the position of
Ibn Rifada himself. His base appears to be Haikl, a place close to the sea, some
30 miles south of Aqaba. His total force had grown by the latter part of June to