مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [ظ‎‎٢‎٩‎٠] (٨٠٢/٥٨١)

6
Rifada revolt ended either to investigate and punish complicity in Transjordan
or to guard against similar abuse of British-controlled territory in the future.
353. On the 23rd November, upon receipt of telegraphic confirmation from
Aden that the rising in Asir (which is reported in paragraphs 363 to 366 below)
was being fomented by the Dabbaghs, and in view of the importance given in the
intercepted plans of these conspirators to simultaneous risings in north and-
south. His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires made telegraphic enquiry of the HigP
Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan whether there was any danger of
the conspirators’ associates in these countries trying to foment another revolt in
the Northern Hejaz. General Wauchope replied that, although there were no
indications of any such attempt, it could not be said that there was no possibility
of associates in Transjordan communicating with their friends in the Hejaz;
watch, however, was being kept. His Majesty’s Government had meanwhile
informed His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires, on the 25th November, that, as
regards the Saudi memorandum of the 15th November, it might be preferable not
to answer, but that, as regards possible action against anti-Saudi conspirators in
Transjordan, the High Commissioner was being requested to expedite his views.
Saudi Reaction.
354. On the 25th November, however, His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires had
had cause to telegraph home the gist of a circumstantial local report received
from a confidential source, to the effect that a letter from the Amir Abdullah to
one of the Dabbagh fraternity had been captured by the Saudi forces in Asir,
and that this had decided Ibn Saud to concentrate forces of his Ikhwan near the
Transjordan border, preparatory to demanding of His Majesty’s Government
the Amir Abdullah's dismissal. On the 27th November His Majesty’s Charge
d’Affaires received a second Saudi memorandum, dated the 26th. It was briefer
and more incisive in tone than the first and bore signs of having emanated from
Ibn Saud himself at Riyadh. It referred to reports from the northern frontier
and news from southbound travellers into Nejd, which pointed to unusual
activity on the part of the Shereef Abdullah (cf. paragraph 350). It repeated
that participation by the shereefs and their associates in the rebellion of
Ibn Rifada was established. It recalled the indignation aroused in Nejd by
Transjordan intrigue and encouragement of Ibn Rifada’s attempt, and also the
difficulty which the Saudi Government had then had in restraining their
tribesmen from attacking Transjordan. It ended by pointing out the danger of
the tribes of Nejd getting finally out of hand if decisive action were not taken
in Transjordan to put an end to anti-Saudi activities.
355. In telegraphing the substance of this memorandum to His Majesty’s
Government, His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires observed that something fairly
serious must have occurred to cause Ibn Saud to threaten His Majesty’s Govern
ment with the uncontrollability of his Ikhwan. He attributed it to a combination
of bad news from Asir, disquieting news from the Transjordan frontier and the
absence of evidence of any effective measures taken in Transjordan itself, which
had determined Ibn Saud to take his own measures to forestall yet another
vicarious aggression by the Amir Abdullah. Mr. Hope Gill expressed the view
that if Ikhwan were, in fact, being moved northward, no mere words would
restore Ibn Saud’s confidence in His Majesty’s Government to the point of
making him check the movement. Once it developed, His Majesty’s Government
could only resist it. He submitted the advisability, before it developed, of taking
radical action in Transjordan, at least against the Shereef Shakir, who seemed
richly to deserve it, if the Shereef Abdullah himself could not, in the interests of
major policy, be punished with dismissal. He finally recorded the conviction
that in the long run His Majesty’s Government must choose between the
Amir Abdullah and Ibn Saud.
British Intervention.
356. A serious view of the situation was taken in London. Jerusalem was
informed on the 3rd December that the continuance of the position, in which
His Majesty’s Government were unable to deny the accusation of hostile
activities made by Ibn Saud against the Amir Abdullah and his associates, was
embarrassing and ignominious. Unless radical steps were taken in the near