مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [ظ‎‎٢‎١‎٩] (٨٠٢/٤٣٩)

2
deposited in London as cover for a note issue on a sterling basis. The new bank
would have privilege of issue, the note issue would be a forced currency, the bank
and the Government would divide the profits and the bank would do ordinary
banking business as well. If the Saudi Government would not put up their
share of the capital, Mr. Ydlibi’s friends would lend them the money, but there
would be no other loan transaction. Mr. Ydlibi had not yet fixed his Britmlu
bank, but anticipated no difficulty as the business would be as safe as hou^Y
His hopes of putting his schemes through in time to leave Jedda on the
21st March were disappointed; he left on the 23rd March.
(b) Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) put through on
the 21st March a contract to supply the Government with 2 million rounds of
cartridges. This deal was projected last June (paragraph 130 of report for
that month), but languished until, at last, the Ministry of Finance concluded
it with all speed.
(c) Dr. Nomland, of the Standard Oil Company of California (paragraph 39
of the February report), left for Yanbu on the 22nd March, presumably to assess
the oil possibilities of the littoral north of that port. The company imported
an aeroplane into Hasa for survey work early in March. They were understood
at the end of the month to have obtained, not without difficulty, permission to
bring it into use. The survey appears to be planned on an ambitious scale.
(d) The Mecca press boomed the formation of an “Arabian Export
Company with a capital of £5,000 gold in £5 shares. The list of subscribers
includes all the best people in native official and commercial life, headed by the
Amir Feisal, who took up ten shares.
(e) The Banque Misr group have opened offices in Jedda, with a sign which
relates only to the agency for their ships, one of which, the Zemzem (ex-Bibby
Leicestershire), made three voyages with pilgrims from Egypt. The offices are
situated in a new house, in front of the Soviet Legation, to which it was formerly
intended to serve as an annex.
II. —Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.
49. The evolution of the Saudi-Yemen situation justified the prognostication
o± some that the King was only waiting to make sure of his pilgrims to force
the pace with the Imam. On the 17th March Taufiq Bey Hamza intimated
to Sir Andiew Ryan that the Amir Feisal was doubtful as to whether peace
would be preserved. On the 22nd March he brought a formal message from
the Amu to the effect that neither the meetings of delegates at Abha nor further
direct correspondence between the King and the Imam had produced any result
and that the King had ordered his troops to advance, with a view to the recovery
° f j P^ 10 ^ 1 ° f his territor y in th e Faifa-Beni Malik area which had been
invaded by Abdul Wahhab-al-Idnsi with Yemeni forces. His Majesty had left
the door open for peace, but, if no satisfactory communication were received
from the Imam by the time the heir apparent reached the frontier, it might
be necessary to cross it. Two days later Sheikh Yusuf Yasin called and’ descanted
at length on the course of events and the faithlessness of the Imam. On both
occasions Sir Andrew Ryan urged prudence, with special reference to the danger
of ci eating an ineparable situation by entering admittedly Yemeni territory
5°. The advance began on the 20th March. The Amir Saud himself set
out on the 22nd March. The Kmg*made a speech at his annual dinner for
notable pilgrims that evening, in which he vigorously defended his past
proceedings and the present action, which had been thrust on him by a man
whmn he had regarded as his dearest friend. Everything that was published
m the Umm-al-Qura next day and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said to Sir Andrew Rvan
next day seemed to indicate that the Saudi Government regarded themselves
as committed to war, but a communique published on the 30th March reported
that the King was still pursuing his efforts for peace in correspondenc e P with
the Imam and added that no armed conflict had yet occurred. This was probablv
true, despite rumours in Mecca of fighting and Saudi reverses. There was
no news up to the end of the month of any Saudi advance into Najran or
towards Medi. J
51. Nothing of importance was reported in connexion with Ibn Saud’s
relations with his other neighbours. His Majesty’s Government considered