مجموعة ٦/ ٩ "تقارير جدة يناير ١٩٣١ -" [و‎‎٢‎١‎٥] (٨٠٢/٤٣٠)

3
of Nairan; withdrawal from the mountain area, release of a,ll hostages taken
there and cessation of interference therein; surrender of the Idnsis tne imam
has gone on expressing complete readiness to comply, asking t a os
should be suspended, and pressing Ibn Saud to receive at Mecca e .
of the late Yemeni delegation at Abha, with a view to fne S otiat ^ s t
The King has consented to receive this gentleman, Abdullah-al-Wazir, subject
^,o a warning that his visit can make no difference until the demands are compile
with. It is understood that in a telegram of the 29th April, not ve pu is e ,
the Imam claimed to have fulfilled the condition in regard to Najran, which
he has certainly evacuated under pressure, and asked for ten days m which to
fulfil the other two. On the 30th April Abdullah-al-Wazir arrived in Mecca.
74 The war has caused much scandal among outside Moslems and
Arabs. Various groups and individuals in Egypt and elsewhere have made
belated efforts at mediation. The most active step m this direction has been
the formation of a delegation consisting of Haj Amm Husaym, president ot the
Supreme Moslem Council in Palestine; the well-known Arab leader ol Druse
origin, the Amir Shakib Arslan; Hashim Bey-al-Atasi, a well-known Syrian
politician; and Muhammad Ali Pasha Allouba, an Egyptian ex-Mmister and
lawyer. These gentlemen arrived in Jedda on the 16th April. They were given
an official reception, and have been greatly feted in Mecca, but thev make no
difference. They do not seem to have any intention of going on to Sana.
75 It was reported on the 27th April that there were some thirty-six
British families at Medi, where the situation still appeared to outside observers
to be obscure. Arrangements were made for H.M.S. Penzance to Y 1 ® 1 ^ ^ , P^ ace
with the sole object of reassuring and, if necessary, assisting British subjects.
It was impossible to warn the Saudi Government before her arrival on the
evening of the 28th April, and the Amir Feisal, who had in fact taken possession
of Medi two davs earlier, protested. Ibn Saud felt injured by this visit all the
more so as he had promised that British persons and interests would be fully
safeguarded in any place his forces might occupy. On the 30th April
Sir Andrew Ryan expressed surprise at the attitude which the Amir reisal had
taken up, and there ensued a friendly exchange of views and explanations between
him and Fuad Bey Hamza. It is hoped that this will have cleared the air.
76. A portion of the long announced Saudi Green Book on the Saudi-Yemen
dispute was published in the Mecca Umm-al-Qurci on the 27th April, and the
whole book appeared on the 29th.
77. For some time past His Majesty’s Government have been considering
the question of boundaries in the east of Ibn Sand’s dominions, with special
reference to the position in regard to Qatar. Among the reasons which have
invested this question with new importance are the grant of the Hasa oil
concession to the Standard Oil Company of California last year, uncertainty as
to the territorial extension given to it by the Saudi Government, the danger of
the American interests finding means to establish themselves in Qatar, and the
dubious attitude of the Sheikh of Qatar, who appears, despite his treaty with
His Majesty’s Government, to have come to some sort of terms with Ibn Saud.
His Majesty’s Government have decided to take their stand on treaty arrange
ments made between them and the Turkish Government in 1913 and 1914. The
effect of these was to determine the limits of Turkish sovereignty by a
“ blue line ” running down south from a point on the west coast of the Gulf
of Bahrein to parallel 20 degrees N., and a violet line thence to a place in
the Aden Protectorate. It^ does not necessarily follow that the sovereignty
of the Sheikh of Qatar and the other trucial rulers extends up to this boundary,
which must be regarded as constituting a British sphere of influence^ This
view, though strong in law, is unlikely to appeal to Ibn 8>aud, who has in fact
exerted influence, if not authority, as well, east of the blue line. Any discussion
with him might perhaps have been postponed, had^ not the I nited States
Government made enquiries which caused His Majesty’s Government to explain
to them their view of the effect of the Anglo-Turkish conventions. This helped
to decide the question of whether the views of His Majesty’s Government should
be conveyed to Ibn Saud, and afforded a means by which this could be done with
the minimum appearance of provocation. On the 28th April His Majesty’s
Minister, acting under carefully concerted instructions, addressed a note to the
Saudi Government informing them, as a matter of courtesy, of the enquiry by
the United States Government, and the reply which had been returned.
[106 gg—1] b 2