ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٩] (٣٣٠/٣٢٢)

2S
in the neutral z^he as will operate to exclude Germany from obtaining a predominating
position in the Persian Gulf. The lines which Colonel Cox recommends are:—
(1) From Mohammerah to Julfa,
(2) From Mohammerah via Khor Musa, Behbehan and Shiraz to Kerman.
(3) From Bandar Abbas to Shiraz.
We concur with Colonel Cox as to the supreme importance of obtaining some snob
concessions as a cond tion precedent to our co-operation in the main through route. We are
not aware how far Russia has pledged herself to support Germany in obtaining an outlet
for the Bn ghdad railwav on the Persian Gulf. But there is clearly a danger that, if an
agreement is not arrived at between ourselves and Russia on the subject of branch lines
in the neutral zone, Germany may subsequently obtain such a position on the Gulf as
must seriously jeopardise our interests, both commercial and strategical. We would, there
fore, recommend that, in addition to sunporting us in obtaining a concession for a line from
Bandar Abbas or Charbar to Bam and Kerman, Russia be asked to co-operate with us in
securing concessions for railway lines—
(1) From Mohammerah to Hamarlan, or to such point between Mohammerah and Julfa
as will intersect the extension of the Baghdad Railway between Khanikin and Tehran.
(2) From Mohammerah vid Khor Musa, Behbehan and Shiraz to Bandar Abbas.
(3) From Bushire to Shiraz and thence to Ispahan .
These concessions should, we think, be adequate to prevent the intrusion of the German
line into the neutral zone, provided that a guarantee is obtained from Persia that she will
grant no other concessions iu this zone which are likely to compete with tlie lines which we
have indicated. The lines from Bandar Abbas or Charbar to Bam or Kerman and from
Mohammerah northwards should, we think, be proceeded with simultaneously with ti»e
construction of the main Hue; the other concessions would not necessarily be utilised in
practice, but would be retained for blocking purposes. Meanwhile, it would be an advantage
to make detailed surveys of all the propased routes in order that there may be no unnecessary
delay when once it is decided to proceed with any particular scheme.
9 . We observe that the Consortium contemplate the internationalisation of the through
line. We think that in view of the recent negotiations between Russia and Germany in
regard to the connection of the Baghdad railway witn the through Persian line, it is of para
mount importance that the through line should be international. Otherwise we are faced
with the possibility of a Russian line being constructed through Northern Persia linked with
the Baghdad railway and operating by differential rates to the detriment of British trade.
We consider further that it would be an advantage, with a view to maintaining full oppor
tunities for the development of trade, that all branch lines made vvituin leisia itself,
should be internationalised.
In ternationalis-
ation of through
and branch
lines.
As to the Powers which should he admitted to participate in these international project*
we can offer no useful opinion. But we assume that Russia and Great Britain will retain a j
preponderating share in the undertaking, and that any financial responsibility incuir d by the
latter will be ^borue equally by the Indian and Imperial exchequers. We think also that it
would be a distinct advantage to offer a certain number of shares to the Persian Government
with a view both to enlist their interest in the successful working of the line and to
obviate any suspicion that the project is likely to affect the integrity of Persia. Should this
be decided, it would be necessary to stipulate that Persia should not part with hei shaies
without the consent of Russia and Great Britain.
10. A subsidiary question which has to be considered is that of the gauge to be adopted The question
for the through route, and the place where the break of gauge, if there is to lie one, should of gauge,
be located. We are of opinion that from the point of view of the security of India, it is of
the utmost importance that the gauge of the line passing through British territory and the
British zone in Persi t should be different from that of the line passing through the Russian
zone We also think that India should have the right to select the gauge for this section and
that it shou’d be narrower than the gauge on the northern section of the line : since a hostile
Power would find it much more difficult to widen a narrow gauge than to lay a line within a
broader gauo-e. We think that, from the Indian point of view, the most suitable place for the
change of ^auge would be at a port on the Gulf, and we recommend that Bandar Abbas,
which is on the border of the British zone, be selected for t :e purpose.
H Tk ere i s one f U; -ther point which we desire to mention before closing our report. It
will be seen irom what has been said above that the governing considerations iu determining
the alignment for the through route are, in our opinion, those connected wi'h the attitude
of the Amir and the effect of the proposed railway on the problem of the defence of India.
It will be for His Majesty's Government to decide bow far th. se considerations should be put
forward in discussing the question with the Russian Government. But we suggest that in
dealing with a matter of such vital importance to India, it would not be out of ( lace to state
plainly*to the Russian Government the reasons for u hi h Great Britain is unable to assent to the
Kerman-Seistan-Nushki connection and to invite a frank exchange of views on the subject.