ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٨‎٢] (٣٣٠/١٦٨)

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APPENDIX.
Extracts from opinions of various Authorities.
I.
Board of Trade, 13th September 1910.
“ The Board desire ... to state . . . that in their opinion the
scheme in question is of a very speculative character and has been put
forward mainly in Russian interests ....
“ In any event, while Russian trade would probably be considerably
benefited by the construction of such a line as that proposed— and possibly
Indian trade also in a less degree—United Kingdom trade would probably
not be benefited by it to any material extent, at any rate for a long time
after its opening. The possibility, indeed, might have to be faced that the
expansion of Russian trade in the interior of Persia might take place at the
expense of purely United Kingdom trade.
“ The Board .... agree with Mr. Worthington’s view that so far
as regards through traffic, the transport of passengers would probably form
the bulk of the business of such a line, though even here the powerful com
petition of the sea route would always remain to be contended against. As
regards through goods traffic, whether to the 1 ar Bast, to Australasia, or to
the Persian Gulf littoral, they do not think that the railway route would
be utilised to any appreciable extent ....
“ . . . If . . . two conditions be fulfilled, viz., a line from
Kerman to the Gulf in the control of which British influence should pre
dominate, and equal facilities for all throughout the whole railway, the Board
think that His Majesty’s Government might adopt an attitude of benevolent
neutrality towards the scheme. .....
“ The Board, however, doubt if, from a commercial point of view, the
scheme is for the present likely to prove a success oi to attiact the investing
public, unless the British, Indian, or Russian Governments, or the three
jointly, are prepared to offer a guarantee of a certain minimum return on the
capital embarked.”
II.
Chief Commissioner, Baluchistan (Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E.),
20th December 1910.
“ . . . ft is unwise to expect that the present isolation of Persia can
longer continue, or that we can indefinitely maintain freedom for India from
intercommunication by rail from the west.
“ The present proposal offers opportunities of a mutual arrangement on
favourable terms, and if we decline to take advantage of it, we may be
compelled hereafter to seek similar inter-railway connection under less
favourable conditions. i , ,
“ The proposed railway must benefit Russian trade m much largei
proportion than British trade, but it will benefit Indian trade and largely
increase the bulk of both British and Indian trade by the opening up ol
Persia
‘ It will increase the receipts of Indian railways and theieby benefit
Indian revenues. . . .
“ The military or political disadvantages of mter-railway communication
are less than might at first sight be supposed, and are largely counteracted
by the access afforded by the line to Seistan. <
“ These conclusions are arrived at on the assumption that our efforts are
directed to preventing the line destroying the autonomy of I eraia
S. 192.
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