ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٨‎١] (٣٣٠/١٦٦)

(d) That the question of maritime facilities to be granted on the Persian
Gulf, and of the control of such port or ports, must be a subject of
agreement between the British and Persian Governments.
As regards (a) the Government of India have indicated a willingness to
compromise on an alignment that would enter the British sphere a little to
the north of Bunder Abbas, and, eliminating that port, would reach the sea
at Chahbar. This is a point for the Defence Committee; but primd facie
there seem strong objections to the creation of a port of that nature on the
open sea outside the Gulf.
(b) Represents the formal and twice repeated opinion of the Government
of India.
(c) Was recommended by the Government of India’s Committee on the
o-round that a hostile Power would find it more difficult to widen a narrow
O
gauge than to lay a line within a broader gauge.
(d) Will require careful consideration by the Defence Committee. It will
obviously be a stumbling block to the Societe, and it may be that if other
adequate measures are taken to secure the entrance to the Gulf, it wall be a
matter of indifference to us who controls the ports inside it. And again, it
may be considered that, if it is essential that we should control the ports, we
can more easily secure the control through the Railway Company than
through the Persian Government. But in the first instance, and to prevent
the question escaping from our hands, it seems desirable to make this
stipulation.
A. H.
3rd January 1913.
NOTE.
Three points of disadvantage in the Trans-Persian Railway scheme
which do not seem to have been sufficiently considered are submitted for
examination.
(1.) The loss to British Shipping. —The Russian promoters count the
mail subsidy among their assets. The subsidy paid to the Peninsular and
Oriental by His Majesty’s Government is 305,000L Again, if an extensive
passenger traffic by railway really springs up, the loss will fall almost
entirely on the Peninsular and Oriental, for the railway will always be
dearer' than the sea route, and the Peninsular and Oriental are the dearest
sea route. The Peninsular and Oriental have few friends—deservedly ;
but they are still a British Company, and is not more justification required
than has yet been shown for taking money out of the pocket of an all-
British Company, and putting it into the pocket of a company of which
only one-third will be British ?
(2.) The loss to Indian Ports. —If the railway is built Bunder Abbas
will become a great port at the expense of Bombay and Karachi. The
Board of Trade seem to anticipate that any advantage that may accrue from
the railway will be to Indian rather than British trade. No reason is given
for that view. But in any case, will not British goods destined for Persia—
instead of going, as at present, to Bombay or Karachi and being transshipped
there—go direct to Bunder Abbas ? This would apply also to the trade via
other Gulf ports and also Bagdad ; and it should be remembered that the
trade of the British Empire with Persia is nearly double that of purely
Indian trade with Persia, and is worth some three millions sterling.
(3.) The dead loss to Indian Revenues on the section from Bunder Abbas
to Karachi. —All authorities are agreed that owing to the nature of the
country through which it runs this section cannot in any case be profitable,
but attention has not been called to the full extent and nature of the probable
loss. If a passenger traffic springs up, there will, it is true, be the passengers.
But even supposing that the existence of the railway stimulates Indian trade,
it will apparently only be goods from the north of India that will be sent by
rail. For seeing that there must necessarily be break of bulk at Bunder