ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٨‎٠] (٣٣٠/١٦٥)

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the Societe and the Syndicate should come to terms, and if the latter
refuse to do so, the British group would not improbably withdraw.
Now, inasmuch as the Syndicate have applied for a mining
concession in the Kerman area, it is very unlikely that they will be
willing to let the Bunder Abbas-Kerman line go unless His
Majesty’s Government apply pressure. And it is submitted that
as regards both this line and the others for which they have
promised their support His Majesty’s Government would not only
be justified in not applying such pressure, but ^vould not be
justified in applying it. For these are the lines—lines from the
Gulf inland—which by universal consent are the lines which will
really further British interests, and there can be no reason for
allowing them to pass out of British hands into the hands of an
international Company who will work them in the interests of the
main line. This applies especially to the Bunder Abbas-Kerman
line, because it is in the British sphere, and, Kerman being one of
the danger points, ought to remain under purely British control. If
this course is adopted Mr. Greenway should be asked to apply for
this concession at once—or as soon as the Mohammerah-Khorremabad
concession is assured.
By neither of these alternatives can His Majesty’s Government hope
to escape the odium with the Russian Government of having wrecked
the scheme; for Lord Revelstoke (who, it is understood, is already using
every means of inducing the Russian Government to put pressure on us)
will not fail to let it be generally known.
(3 ; ) To continue to support the scheme, though without enthusiasm, in
principle, trusting that when it comes eventually to be put before the
public, it will prove to be hopelessly unattractive. Taken by itself this
which is the course we have hitherto been pursuing—has little" to recommend
it except that it postpones for a year or so the painful necessity of taking a
decision. Combined with ( 2 ) (c) it would probably be effective ; alone it
seems too risky; and moreover exposes us to constant friction ’ with the
British group in the meantime.
Of all these alternatives undoubtedly (1) is the best, because it is the
most straightforward; but if ior diplomatic reasons it is impracticable
then the line of least resistance is ( 2 ) (c) and (d) in combination. But if it
is decided to adopt any of these courses it is most important that the
Mohammerah-Khorremabad concession should be absolutely assured before
our hand is shown ; for the Russians will undoubtedly try to block it if
the} find that we are backing out of the Trans-Persian scheme. Great
pressure should therefore be exercised at Tehran to secure it with the least
possible delay.
If the scheme is to he supported.
If, however, His Majesty’s Government decide that the Trans-Persian
railway scheme is one which they must ex animo support in the interests of
this countiy and of India, it is essential, as pointed out above, first of all to
bung the Societe and the Persian Railways Syndicate to terms regarding
branch lines. It also seems desirable to give the fullest possible information
or tie guidance of the British group. There are of course some questions
In C l/ a T d f- d f d at the present sta S e ’ and ^ is necessary that we
“ ™ ke f th ® S r AT teSt r f ei T atlons on the PO^ts covered by Foreign
Office letter of 23rd November last to Sir W. E. Garstin, viz., alignment
constitution of Board, representation of British interests percentage of
construction orders freight and passenger rates, and gauge But while
keeping a free hand on all these points, it is still possible to give the group
as'a'workfng ^ ^ told ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية * *4 must assume
(hi S it bust no^gntd sphere at Bunder Abbas -
(C) 1 Ae tblTelf s^tLlflhelLf bas must be narr0Wer than that