ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٣٣٠/١٦٤)

If that attempt has been successful, then, in order to justify British
encouragement of the scheme, we are driven back on the first reason
suggested on page 1, viz., the desire to please the Russian Government. If
it is really the case that the withdrawal of our encouragement will endanger
the entente, and if the European position, and the position of Great Britain
in international politics, are therefore such as to make it necessary— even in
the face of the dangers and disadvantages indicated by two successive Chiefs
of the Imperial General Staff—to come into line with Russia (a matter of which
the India Office has no cognizance), there is nothing more to be said.‘ :;: '
If the scheme is to be abandoned.
But if that is nut so, and the question is still open, it is for consideration
whether His Majesty’s Government should not take the first opportunity of
receding from a policy which is so likely to develop to their disadvantage.
There are four ways in which this can be done :—
( 1 .) The Russian Government can be frankly informed that after further
full consideration His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that the time is not
ripe for the scheme, which cannot, in any conditions that can be foreseen
within a reasonable period, be expected to pay, and entails other incon
veniences and responsibilities which we are unwilling to incur except in return
for advantages of which this scheme offers no certainty. It might be suggested
that, leaving this more ambitious proposal to the future, the tv\m Bowers
should in the meantime confine themselves to, and at once take in hand,
railway development in their own spheres, and, by joint agreement, in the
neutral sphere. If the larger scheme is really “ inevitable ” it will come of
itself when the lines more immediately profitable have been constructed.
At the same time it would be necessary to deal with the question of a
loan to Persia; for, as Lord Crewe has pointed out, by agreeing that the
Societe d’Etudes should also be the agency for floating a loan, we have put
into Russia’s hands the means of exerting great pressure on us ; since, if the
Societe find the money, we can hardly object to their having the concession.
This is a most important consideration, and must be borne in mind, even if
the view taken m this memorandum is not accepted, and the scheme is
proceeded with. If the Societe find the money now and produce a scheme
which contains features objectionable to India, the pressure to sacrifice
Indian interests will be very severe. .
(2.) To make it impossible for the British group to go on. Phis can be
done either:—
(a) By telling them—or letting them understand in reply to the diiect
question asked in Sir W. Garstin’s letter of 9 th December that His
Majesty’s Government regard the scheme with disfavour ; or
(b) By telling them, in reply to that letter and the letter of 20th December,
that His Majesty’s Government can give them no further guidance
and cannot promise support to any particular scheme befoiehand
a rather dangerous course seeing that, if the British group went
on in spite of this discouragement, a concession in terms
inconvenient to us might be possibly carried through by Russian
pressure at Tehran and forced upon us ;
(c) By informing the British group at once of oui conditions and making
them so stringent that it will not be worth while to pioceed.
(d) By encouraging the Persian Railways Syndicate to adopt a non
possumus attitude as regards branch lines. I he British group
have stated that the main line will depend for its success on the
traffic brought by certain branches, of which it is understood that
they attach special importance to one from Bunder Abbas to
Kerman. On the other hand His Majesty’s Government are under
a binding obligation to support the Persian Railways Syndicate m
respect of certain lines in Southern Persia, of which the Bunder
Abbas-Kerman Iiiig is ons. Obviously tliGrcfor© it is essential that *
* Except that, as between Indian and Imperial revenues, the situation indicated m India
Office letter of 6th April 1911 will thus have arisen and if Indian frontiers are made more
vulnerable by a scheme of railway extension, which Imperial policy and the attitude of His
“ Majesty’s Grovemment towards European Powers force upon the acceptance of India, her
“ claims upon the Imperial Exchequer will be strong.”