ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٧‎٩] (٣٣٠/١٦٣)

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transport may so altor tliat what is impossibl© now will hocomo inGvitabla
then. But no practical policy can be based on that assumption, which may
safely be left to be dealt with until it has verified itself. What has to be
remembered is that by wdiatever line the approach is made there lie between
British India and the Persian frontier not less than 360 miles of waterless
desert; and it is submitted that the inevitableness, in existing conditions, of
a railway across that gap has not been proved.
Conclusions.
It would doubtless be possible to attach too much weight to these
considerations. If there were a strong case for the Trans-Persian Railway
on its own merits, they might be allowed to weigh very lightly against it.
But notoriously there is not. This memorandum does not profess to deal
with that part of the subject, which has been exhaustively discussed by
all the competent authorities, to whose conclusions there is nothing at
present to be added' :!: \ A selection of them is, however, printed in an
appendix, in order that stock may once more be taken of them collectively.
In doing so two points must be borne in mind as regards the Indian
authorities : —
( 1 .) The Government of India’s opinion is, on the surface, less qualified
than the others. But it should be noted that they refer to their Committee’s
report and say that they concur generally in its conclusions. But those
conclusions are drawn from certain premisses, and, in the absence of any
statement to the contrary, it must be assumed that the Government of India
accept the premisses also. These are stated as follows :—
“ 4. While, therefore, from the point of view of military policy there can
be little question that the maintenance of the status quo would be
preferable to the construction of the proposed railway, and while it
seems at least doubtful wdiether the advantages to Indian trade
would be at all commensurate with the advantages which would
accrue to Russian trade with Persia, or with the financial outlay
involved in the undertaking, we are nevertheless of opinion that
having regard to the desirability of meeting the wishes of the Russian
Government and the importance of obtaining a due share in the
control of any railway that may be made in Persian territory, and in
view of the opportunity which now offers of obtaining concessions
for branch lines which are important to us, both strategically and
commercially, the Government of India will be well advised to
accept in principle the proposals of the Russian Consortium,
subject to such conditions in respect of alignment, branch
lines, &c., as may be considered necessary to secure the safety of
India and the development of Indian trade.”
The Government of India s recommendation must therefore be taken as
subject to the same qualification as the others.
(2.) Lord Morley, in sending out the scheme to the Government of India,
asked them to examine it, “bearing in mind the desire of His Majesty’s
^ Government to find themselves on common ground with the Russian
Government, so far as the } 7 can do so consistently with their primary duty
“ of insuring Indian interests against all probable risks.” (Secret Despatch
No. o2, of 4th November 1910). It may therefore be assumed that all those
who gave opinions intended to give the most favourable opinions thev
conscientious 1 } could, lhat this was actually so is obvious even from the
selection in the appendix; it becomes plainer if the opinions are read in
iulJ. We have in them, then, the utmost that can be said for the scheme,
and the burden of all of them is in effect, “ we do not like the scheme of a
r£ through lailway, it has no merits of its own, and many dangers; but on
^ certain consideiations, not strictly relevant to the scheme of a Trans-
Persian^railway as such, w r e must acquiesce in it with as good a grace as
we can. Ihe object of this memorandum has been to attempt to show
that those extraneous considerations are without substance.