ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٧‎٩] (٣٣٠/١٦٢)

parties concerned are India, Persia, Russia, and Germany. That the
through line will either pay India, or is necessary commercially to her
in self-defence or as an outlet for her goods, the overwhelming mass of
authority denies, as has already been observed, and the British group have
tSir W . E. Garstin’s letter of 9th Sta * ed * llat “'t' th ® Iwancfi lines can
December 1912. make the project profitable.! Persia
needs railways, but it is difficult to see
what commercial or financial advantage she will derive from the
establishment of through railway connexion with Europe across her
territory, since ex hypolhesi that connexion will not pay India. What
will benefit her enormously is the extension of the Russian system, or of
the Bagdad Railway, to Tehran and Ispahan ; but she has nothing to gain by
their extension east of Yezd. Similarly she will benefit greatly by British
railways from the Gulf, but it does not appear that there will be any such
additional gain by the formation of a through connexion as would make it
financially profitable on its own account or in any sense commercially necessary
to her. As regards Russia, if our authorities are correct, and as through
connexion will not pay India, it is difficult to see how it can pay Russia, and
it is noteworthy that even the Russian promoters ask for a guarantee. What
will pay Russia, and is in fact necessary to her, is the extension of her
system throughout her sphere, not a through railway for its own sake. The
case of Germany is substantially the same, but it seems probable that a
through German line is less unlikely to pay than the Russian scheme. An
extension of the Bagdad Railway from Khanikin via Ispahan and Yezd is both
considerably shorter, and, being German, likely to be more efficient. There
is, no doubt, the disadvantage of break of bulk at the Bosphorus; but if our
authorities are correct in assuming that there will be no appreciable through
traffic in goods, that will not be a prohibitive obstacle, while for passengers
it will present no difficulty, since on a journey of that duration there would
probably be one change of train in any case. The Russian promoters have
expressed a fear of the contingency of a German extension such as that
indicated above, but it is not known whether our own experts have ever
studied the problem from the German point of view; but on the assumption
that such a through line will pay and will indeed be inevitable, the Russian
Trans-Persian scheme will obviously not only not hinder it but will be
ruined by it, since the Germans can and will effect a short circuit. And if
this view is correct our policy now should be to negotiate with Germany,
not with Russia, for a Trans-Persian railway—a proposal which is not at
present before us.
To whom, then, is a through line necessary for strategical or political
reasons ? Certainly not to India, who, it is universally admitted, stands
only to lose in those respects. As regards Persia, there is room for difference
of opinion as to whether she will gam or Jose politically by the construction
of such a line. Railways in general, no doubt, conduce to the maintenance
of order ; but railways themselves cannot be constructed and worked unless
order is maintained, and there is something of a circle here. Again, it is
open to question whether the construction and working of railways by
foreigners conduces to independence ; though, so far as such railways are
international, scope is afforded to an oriental Government for its favourite
device of playing off one Power against another, and so maintaining its own
uneasy balance. But if the case be put at its highest it can hardly be
maintained that a Trans-Persian railway in particular is so necessary to
Persia politically and strategically that it is bound to be constructed.
When we come to Russia and Germany we are almost bound to assume that
if it is for political and military reasons necessary to either of them it can
only be for offensive purposes against India; and the measure of their
necessity is the measure of ours to prevent and not facilitate those purposes.
It may be argued that a port on the warm water is essential to Russia, quite
irrespective of India, as a base for operations in far Eastern waters, and
that a railway to (say) Chahbar is therefore inevitable. But whether directed
against India or not the incidental danger to India of a Russian base at
Chahbar would be so great that Lord Lansdowne’s warning would have to
become operative.
Of course it is conceivable that in the future the conditions of railway