ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٧‎٨] (٣٣٠/١٦١)

The disadvantages of standing aloof.
* See for example memorandum by
Indian Director-General of Commercial
Intelligence, paragraph 3, memorandum by
President of Indian Kailway Boai’d,
paragraphs 3-8, report of Government of
India’s Committee, paragraph 3.
Now, as regards the former, our only weapon against hostile tariffs is a
friendly international agreement. But the Board of irade are never tired
of telling us that such agreements are of little real use because they do not
touch—and nothing can touch—the indirect methods by which the rival
country can bountify its own trade. What we stand to lose, then, by the
absence of an agreement on the subject of rates is apparently nothing vital.
But again none of the British or commercial authorities who have discussed
the project have recommended it on commercial grounds. Quite the
contrary : all have shown that neither as regards through, nor as regards
local, traffic would it benefit India,
whose trade with Persia—all are agreed
— depends on railways running inland
from the sea-board.If we have these,
we may be able to compete in north-west
and north Persia with Russian goods
imported by rail via Astara, or with German goods imported by rail via
Khanikin. If we have not, a Trans-Persian railway with its long run
through the wilderness from Karachi will not enable us to do so. Again,
therefore, what we stand to lose by the absence of such a railway is
apparently nothing vital.
The strategical and political dangers are perhaps more real. The danger
points to India are presumably Kerman, Robat, and some port on the open sea
between Bunder Abbas (which it is assumed that w r e can seal up with our
ships) and Gwetter on the frontier of British Baluchistan ; and what we have
to fear is that some other Power, i.e., either Russia or Germany, will build a
line to one or other of those points, establish her political influence along it, and
when the time comes deposit an army corps at the end of it. Take Russia
first. So long as the entente exists Russia cannot, except by agreement with
us, get beyond the limits of her own sphere, i.e., Yezcl; but the Trans-
Persian Railway is going there in any case. If, however, the entente has
ceased to exist, Russia is actually or potentially hostile. Bui in either case,
the mere fact that the Trans-Persian Railway was in existence would not
prevent her from building a line to Kerman, and continuing it to Robat if it
were essential to her plan of campaign to do so ; and in either case, and
whether the drans-Persian line were in existence or not, our only safeguard
would apparently be a line of our own from Bunder Abbas to Kerman and
such force as we might be able to maintain on it. While as regards a line
to the sea at, say, Chahbar, its construction by a potentially hostile Russia
would, if Lord Lansdowne s declaration is maintained, be a casus belli, nor
would the existence of the Trans-Persian Railway as such prevent the case
from arising. Of Germany ihe same appears to be true, except that it might
be argued that the existence of a frans-Persian Railway might even increase
the danger because of the standing temptation which, as pointed out below, it
would afford of making a short circuit by an extension from Khanikin to
Ispahan and 1 ezd. W hether there is any real military danger to India to be
apprehended frorn Germany (or Turkey), I do not venture to discuss. If
there is, then against Germany, as against Russia, the safeguard lies not in
a Trans-Persian railway but in the possession of British railway concessions
in the Biitish sphere Bunder Abbas - Kerman for construction, and
Bunder Abbas-Gwettur, and possibly Chahbar-Kerman and Kerman-Robat,
for blocking purposes.
Is a Trans-Persian Hallway inevitable ?
. . submitted, therefore, that if those concessions are obtained—and
it is assumed that it is not beyond the power of British diplomacy to obtain
them—-there is no additional danger, commercial or strategical, involved in
standing out now fiom the Trans-Persian project, even if it can be built
vGthout us and is inevitable. But is it inevitable ? It has been assumed
iy very high authorities that it is, and a different opinion can only be
expressed ^ with gieat diffidence. There seem, however, to be some
considerations pointing in another direction. Presumably a railway is
only inevitable if it is certain that it will pay, or if it is necessary to the
parties concerned for commercial, strategical, or political reasons. The