ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٦‎٣] (٣٣٠/١٣٠)

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6 . K
T ra.ns-?srs ian Railwiv
Raifiarics on Inaia Office raeroorandum* dated $5. i . i 3 «
—^
The opinion of the General Staff in India# formed upwards of a
year ago & not materially altered by subsequent examination, was based on the
^assumption that a through connection with India was sooner or later inevitable
The ou.iects in view in the Gen. Staff recommendations were, (a) to keen the
rrw\l ^
him.,
main line as far from the Afghanistan frontier as possible, (fe> to select an
alignment which would give our Naval power the greatest opportunities for
rendering assistance, (c) to limit the construction of branch lines to those
which would offer the fewest strategical disadvantages, and (d) to force an
enemy to detrain his troops for concentration at a point as far removed from
our frontier as possible. It was especially desired to Prevent at all costs,
£a£ a through connection with India via Kerman, Robat and Nushki, and (b) a Ifc
line by which Russia could gain overland access to the sea at any point East
of the straits. The assumption on which this line of argument was based fol-
-iows the official view of the Sec. of State for India given in letter dated
^ ^ ^ ’ |
The India Office memorandum of S 1.13. discusses the situation from
iifierent point of view, viz: that there is no necessity to assume that a
through railway is inevitable. The Gen. Staff in India have not examined the
jrombfcam under this asoectnor could they Prepare a satisfactory military aoore
•elation of a situation which might assume a dozen or more different forms
irising from so vague a basis as the mere negation of the existence of a
;hrough railway. But I have been asked for my Personal opinion on the pro
position as thus presented, though for the reason given it must necessarily
>e more on the political & commercial factors in the case than on the strateg
ical effect of railways which these factors may or may not Produce.
The Gen. Staff aimed at avoiding two dangers which they considered vejy
reat, as stated above. For this reason they advocated a direct line to Bandar
ejas and thence axong tne coast to Karachi. If tne avoidance of these dangers
ouid be assured in any other way, we should willingly see the line from Banda:
.bbas to Karachi abandoned altogether.Its only virtue lies in its maxing the
xistence of another ana far more oangerous line impossible, for presumably
here is no prospect of two through lines. I personally doubt whether the dan =3
gers referred to, i.e. a line through Kerman and Nushki, and a port on the
ndian ocean in direct communication with Russia, can be obviated Permanently
ithout some stronger and more definite Policy than that advocated in the
n " ia 011iCe mem# 'Cone can foretell what effect the present situ-